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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to address and contribute to the research evidence on what it means
to implement usable security interfaces in mobile devices given their increasing importance
in our daily lives. We focused on user interfaces for authentication while incorporating
HCI principles to develop and explore design and usability issues. We have done so by
directly observing and reporting on our three different works, with special attention given
to the user practices that create security lapses and usability drawbacks.
The novelty of this research is the confirmation of the integral relationship across our
three works showing that understanding and exploiting inherent human-factors such as
memorability, tactile attributes, kinesiology and other inherent properties for human com-
puter interface (HCI) designs improves security, usability and acceptance. One of our tasks
is re-conceptualizing mobile device interfaces to make them both secure and usable. Our re-
search indicates that interfaces that combine tactile and behavioural human characteristics
into their basic design paradigm are more usable, and systems based on core graphical to-
kens with mnemonic properties result in higher memorability and familiarity values, while
error recovery is strongly influenced by system design. Therefore system interfaces that
can accommodate other familiar compound activities by users greatly reduce errors. One
of our works proposes a new graphical authentication prototype interface to evaluate our
research questions empirically. Our findings indicated that our first work, SemanticLock,
had superior performance on key metrics such as password entry speed, memorability, en-
cumbrance, user acceptance, usability, and likeability when compared with the PATTERN
and PIN authentication techniques.
Secondly, we explored the acceptable levels of complexity an interface could have in
order to be secure and yet still usable by shifting the focus of our second work to the
popular virtual reality device (VR) ecosystem. This work involved immersing participants
in a virtual reality environment where they created passwords on virtual reality versions
i
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of popular mobile device authentication systems with different virtual reality interaction
methods. The virtual reality system allowed us to evaluate the interface and interaction
challenges by providing numerous heterogeneous interaction methods. We explored the
outcome of porting the popular PATTERN authentication system into the virtual reality
environment. We used the mobile device version of PATTERN as a control and the report
indicates that PATTERN in VR is moderately fast, functionally usable and highly resistant
to shoulder-surfing.
For our third work, we examined various technological impediments that make it diffi-
cult to develop secure interfaces and proposed alternatives such as transparent interfaces
that rely solely on the user‘s biometric signatures. We explored this challenge with a
virtual reality (VR) based prototype based on kinesiology, effectively capturing the bio-
metric movement of the participants in VR, and collecting the discerning identifying factors
from each person via machine-learning assisted processes. We evaluated large datasets of
head, eyes and hand movements using machine learning to create a continuous transpar-
ent biometric authentication system. We attained a classification accuracy of 99.7% and
determined that kinesiologically replicating a valid participant with false-positive data is
extremely difficult, thus making this system highly secure and usable.
Our three major works conceptually explore the significant effects of user interactions
on the effective security of their mobile devices. In our first study we determined various
baselines in HCI that were used across the other works. The second work examined the
practical effect of different interaction modes, while the third work explored using the
interactions itself as a resultant effect of security. The compounding relevance among the
works is the user.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The security of information has never been an easy task, and for decades any secure system
is just an incident away from being made vulnerable or useless, and human factors have
always been the weakest link. The term security is diverse and all-encompassing, covering
algorithms and various systems of encryption, including user interfaces. The challenges
of providing adequate consumer and product security have grown exponentially as mobile
devices rapidly have become the key computing platform. In the span of 30 years, mobile
devices have transformed how people access business and personal information; it has
become obvious that security systems must be user-friendly to enhance their efficiency.
The main source of interaction with the first generation of mobile devices was the
physical keypad, and this went mainstream with the introduction of Motorola mobile
devices in 1973 (see Figure 1.1a) using the T9 keyboard layout which was adapted from
desktop phones of that era because user interaction at the time involved inputting numeric
values to make phone calls or respond to tone-based selections. The importance of securing
mobile devices became more evident as the usage of the devices became ubiquitous [82].
The T9 keypad based mobile devices usually required passwords limited to 4 to 6 digits,
which greatly constrained password space. However, the later introduction of QWERTY
keypads made popular with the release of business communication mobile devices such as
the Nokia Communicator 9000 [98] in 1996, the Blackberry 850, and Palm Treo corporate
business smartphone (see Figure 1.1b) circa 1999, allowed for a larger password space as
a result of the QWERTY keypad‘s alphanumeric qualities, and thus both the need and
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1.1: Generations of Mobile devices: (a) [Left] Motorola MicroTAC phone. [Right] The Nokia
9000 QWERTY keypad phone. (b) BlackBerry 850 QWERTY mobile device. (c) Full touch-screen phone.
(Images [52])
ability to implement stronger authentication on business devices went into overdrive.
The new password security practices were based on a mixture of alphanumerics and
symbols, adapted from the personal computer (PC) world, which was popular and yet
cumbersome when used on mobile devices. With these security practices in use, it ensured
text-based password would maintain high entropy [78, 135]; thereby making them secure,
but less usable and also resulted in issues of low memorability [53], leading many users to
avoid using authentication on their mobile devices altogether. In fact, research by Micallef
et al. [80], showed that over 64% of users chose not to secure their mobile devices or utilize
an authentication system because it was deemed inconvenient and cumbersome [50], high-
lighting the serious effect of human behaviour, engagement, and interest on security [21].
In addition, copious research has examined the issues of textual password entry on mobile
devices and the usability problems experienced due to size and input constraints [139, 78],
while other studies have looked into the association of keypad layouts and password security
strengths [19, 54].
Second-generation mobile devices used touchscreen-based virtual keypads, which ini-
tially required stylus-based interactions, but later evolved into the use of fingers as the
resolution technology improved. Full touch-screen mobile devices without an auxiliary
hardware keypad appeared with the release of the iPhone in 2007, bringing in an era
of interactive GUI (graphical user interface) mobile devices and graphical authentication
systems (GAS). As interactive GUI displays became popular and mainstreamed on mo-
bile devices, new sets of graphical authentication systems were developed in an attempt
to alleviate the existing usability problems based on psychology studies which revealed
humans are more adept at recognizing and recalling images than text [14, 13, 35, 129].
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Graphical authentication systems became a viable alternative to the inherent limitations
of text-based authentication systems [143, 76, 139, 123], inspired by studies which showed
the graphical authentication systems had higher memorability and positive usability values
[140, 129, 13, 10]. Although the various approaches, layouts, and designs of these graph-
ical authentication systems were proposed [70, 63, 56, 5], in practice, very few graphical
schemes have been widely adopted, and fewer have had the effectiveness of their security
properties [134, 9, 27].
Our research involves two very different devices, the handheld, and the VR device,
these devices have different form-factors. Handheld devices are very popular and require
little or no setup involvement while providing a diverse set of services to the user. These
handheld devices do not require the users’ full attention or restricted field-of-view (FOV)
and are very portable. The VR devices are mainly head-worn and require a lot of setup
involvement, full focus, connection to a computer, and attention of the user. Unlike hand-
held devices, VR devices can only be used in a secure and contained environment due to its
immersive and FOV requirements. Furthermore, VR devices are comparatively more bulky
and heavier than their hand-held counterparts. Therefore, our approach to designing se-
cure interfaces for these devices is different. For example, because the handheld devices are
more susceptible to third-party observation of displayed information, more care is taken to
prevent against observation attack, whereas the VR device displays are not easily observed
by a third-party, thus another secure interface paradigm is preferred.
Researchers proposed and developed alternative interface layouts and demonstrated dif-
ferent levels of usability and security paradigms through extensive user studies while taking
cues from previous studies into the subject matter [27, 146, 25, 5, 34, 134]. In the upcom-
ing sections, we will review previous work and literature on both graphical authentication
systems (GAS) and virtual reality authentication systems (VRAS) that shall serve as the
bedrock of this thesis. While there are many excellent general reviews [13, 26, 15, 138],
with each to some extent reflects the author‘s personal research interest and expertise.
Due to the pace of development and breadth of research, a truly comprehensive review is
probably impossible, and certainly beyond the scope of this thesis.
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1.2 Motivations
The usage of mobile devices in recent years, during the era of graphical authentication
systems (GAS) [14], has become a significantly important part of daily processes within
our society, with over 23 billion devices owned by individuals globally [141].
While in recent years, giant strides have been made in the field of secure interfaces for
mobile devices [22, 78], and these studies have reported different levels of success. Published
research in the area of graphical authentication systems currently lacks the consistency and
rigorous evaluation of the effects of mobility and encumbrance on security and usability,
therefore making it difficult to compare or reproduce results. We are aware of no such
work in the literature that examines the finer-grained aspect of usability and the sublime
effects of mobility and encumbrance, thus there remains open questions as to acceptable
usability levels among mobile device users.
This thesis explores issues involved in developing usable secure interfaces for mobile
devices, due to the nature of these devices frequently operating in insecure environments,
it provides numerous opportunities for attackers to obtain critical information. We relied
heavily on past works by researchers in the field, that have laid foundations in develop-
ing solutions that prevent attacks to steal sensitive and private information for malicious
purposes. Our motivation is to develop the next generation of interfaces that can provide
mechanisms that are both secure and usable, given the size restrictions and usage char-
acteristics for these mobile devices. We expanded the scope to included non-traditionally
portable virtual reality devices as they steadily become smaller and untethered.
We examine the research gaps by evaluating the below research questions:
• Re-conceptualizing mobile device interfaces to make them both secure and
usable: The main challenges of this research question, has been aptly expressed in
studies by Davis et al. [30], Liang et al [71] and [94, 25, 63, 118]. They found that
graphical authentication systems are susceptible to shoulder surfing, smudge, and
capture attacks, while also suggesting that user interface design decisions may inten-
tionally sway user behaviour towards less secure conducts, therefore usability issues
often significantly impacts real-world security.
Our research examined a novel concept, which involves a new graphical authentica-
tion system design that would focus on increasing password entropy without sacrific-
ing usability and memorability. We created a novel graphical authentication proto-
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type interface named SemanticLock, which uses images as password tokens that allow
constructing a semantically memorable story representing the users password. These
passwords are entered via the familiar and quick action of dragging and positioning
user-defined images on the touchscreen. The interface was designed to incorporate
icons that are non-intrinsically related in order to reduce implicit selection biases.
In addition, a close proximity sticky feature was added to reduce errors common
to mobile devices used on the move. The study involved 63 participants who per-
formed login tasks under various physical postures, motion state and encumbrance.
This study included three main methods, firstly we implemented an evaluation of
exemplar schemes from the three main categories of graphical passwords on both
tablets and smartphones. Secondly, we evaluated the effects of real-world interac-
tions of mobility and encumbrance on all three evaluated graphical authentication
systems, collecting performance metrics for further analysis. Thirdly, we adopted the
methods of psychometrics and developed a questionnaire, for measuring the comfort
of constructing a strong password when using a particular interface. We used ex-
pert recommendations to guide the creation and selection of questions and then
assessed our questionnaire for reliability and validity; the two essential psychometric
properties of a scale. We explored the actual performance factors on the functional
graphical authentication systems (SEMANTICLOCK, PATTERN, PIN) while our
participants walked in an encumbered and unencumbered state during which they
recalled and applied authentication passwords on a mobile device. Novel properties
in our SemanticLock design ensured that our graphical authentication system per-
formed better than the other systems compared in this work. This demonstrated
that with the proper interface and process design the issue of usability and security
can be optimized to be ecologically viable in all scenarios. Our results showed that
interacting with mobile devices for authentication purposes is a physically awkward
and mentally demanding activity while the user is walking and encumbered, thus
gravely affecting overall user security and usability as suggested by other studies
[92, 75, 95, 96]. We demonstrated that SemanticLock is superior to the popular PIN
and PATTERN authentication systems.
• The acceptable levels of complexity an interface could have to be secure
and yet still usable:Users express their commands and intentions via interfaces
provided by the technology they use. The field of HCI has sought to overcome vari-
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ous challenges in interface complexity that cause various security and usability issues.
To explore and identify solutions to various interaction challenges while maintaining
the same baseline. We developed a novel concept that ports the popular authenti-
cation systems into the virtual reality environment, thereby giving us the ability to
implement and try numerous heterogeneous interaction methods. The novelty of our
second work was to explore the complexity, effectiveness and usability of graphical
authentication systems within the virtual reality (VR) environment. We believe that
VR and mobile devices, especially smartphones and tablets are intrinsically linked
in terms of usage, security and usability factors [151, 102, 109, 62]. The experi-
ment involved 15 participants engaged in creating passwords patterns on the VR
PATTERN authentication system using virtual reality hand-held-controller (HHC),
LeapMotion, Eyetracking and head-mounted-display (HMD). We evaluated the suit-
ability of porting the popular PATTERN and PIN graphical authentication systems
for use within virtual reality (VR) by observing their advantages and vulnerabilities,
including the effects of VR interaction techniques/devices. Lastly, we evaluate three
levels of threat in regards to shoulder-surfing in an attempt to demonstrate the high
resistance to shoulder-surfing. Using the mobile phone versions as control, we did a
novel comparative analysis of both environments (mobile phone and VR) and dis-
covered similarities in their metrics. Our results showed that PATTERN and PIN
graphical authentication system was well suited for VR. The participants performed
equally similar within the mobile device and virtual reality environment, they also
performed better using VR interaction methods that were used as an extension of
their hands, and the virtual reality implementation of these graphical authentication
systems were highly resistant to shoulder-surfing; thereby presented a clear advan-
tage when considering the fact that mobile device graphical authentication systems
have very little resistance to shoulder-surfing [73, 111, 55].
• The technological impediments that make it diffcult to develop secure
interfaces: We explored this challenge with a novel virtual reality (VR) based pro-
totype called BioMove, this concept implements a transparent authentication inter-
face by effectively capturing the biometric movement of the users in a virtual reality
environment. High-end virtual-reality (VR) products are striving towards being to-
tally wireless, and this level of mobility widens the useful possibilities in business,
entertainment, and private social media activities. Consequently, this freedom of
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movement no longer makes it conceivable to expect users to login via a keyboard or
other popular tethered authentication methods, but this novel concept, on the other
hand, brings the possibility of using motion data from the user’s VR environment
interactions to determine the identity of the user. Individuals have kinesiologically
unique attributes, therefore having behavioural traits that can be used to uniquely
identify them in a secure, transparent and non-intrusive manner. We first created
a virtual reality environment and conducted a 15 user study where our participants
performed a series of controlled tasks (grabbing, rotating, dropping) that could be
decomposed into unique kinesiological patterns while capturing and monitoring their
hand, head, and eye gaze data. Our result shows the identification confidence values
of factor 0.98 and classification accuracy of 99.7% were obtainable using machine
learning classification methods such as kNN or SVM. This demonstrates the possi-
bility of using motion in VR as a biometric discriminant thereby adding a layer of
transparent authentication that allows these VR applications to be securely used by
multiple users without any perceived inconvenience.
Our three major works explore the significant effects of user interactions on the effective
security and usability of mobile devices. In our first study we determined various baselines
by comparing our novel SemanticLock with two currently popular authentication systems
that were used across the other works. The interface design and data obtained from the first
study was used to define the parameters for the second study. The second work examined
the practical effects of different interaction modes in a virtual reality (VR) environment,
using the PATTERN and PIN authentications systems that were ported into VR from the
first study, and included the study results been used as a baseline for this second study.
The third work, while focusing on usability was conceptually different in approach and
process although it utilised the virtual reality environment to explored using the human
interactions itself as a resultant security.
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1.3 Overview of the Thesis
1.3.1 Contributions
In this thesis, we aim to improve the overall performance of authentication interfaces for
mobile devices by ensuring they are both secure and usable. The contributions of the thesis
are :
• Design of a graphical authentication system, that employs semantic graphical mnemon-
ics to improve the balance between strong security and better usability while accom-
modating the interference elements of mobility, hand-input postures, and encum-
brance.
• Design and implementation of the popular PIN and PATTERN authentication sys-
tems and porting them into the virtual reality environment. This allowed us to
evaluate the security, usability, interface and interaction challenges by providing nu-
merous heterogeneous interaction methods within the virtual reality system.
• Design and implementation of a transparent authentication system based on the
unique kinesiology features of the user within the virtual reality environment. Bio-
metric authentication provides a highly secure and high usability factor due to its
inherent transparent nature.
1.3.2 Organization of this Thesis
The thesis is organized as summarised below:
• Chapter 2: This chapter reviews background knowledge and related work of this
thesis. We first introduce Alphanumeric (Text-based) Passwords, especially the PIN
and QWERTY implementation on mobile devices. Then, we introduce Graphical
Passwords, 3D based Passwords, and Biometric Authentication. Finally, we review
the state-of-art.
• Chapter 3: In this chapter, we introduce SemanticLock, a simple, fast, and mem-
orable single factor graphical authentication approach for mobile devices. The pur-
pose of this novel graphical authentication system was to explore the hypotesis of
reconceptualizing mobile device interfaces to make them secure and usable, and to
that effect, SemanticLock uses a set of graphical images as password tokens that
Chapter 1. Introduction 9
allow constructing a semantically memorable story representing the user’s password.
Passwords are entered via the familiar and quick action of dragging and positioning
user-defined images on the touchscreen. It is well known that for (un)locking mech-
anisms such as PIN or PATTERN, users tend to pick memorable passwords such as
dates or simple (often regular) patterns. This practice by users significantly reduces
the effective password space for these mechanisms. The authentication strength of
SemanticLock is based on the large number of possible semantic constructs derived
from the positioning of the image tokens and the type of images selected. Results
our study comparing SemanticLock against other authentication systems show that
SemanticLock performs similarly to PIN and PATTERN in usability, while have
significantly increased memorability and security.
• Chapter 4: In this chapter, we explored (1) the suitability of porting the popular
PATTERN mobile device authentication system for use within virtual reality (VR)
by observing the advantages and vulnerabilities. (2) The effects of the interaction
devices such as the hand-held-controller (HHC), the LeapMotion sensor, EyeTracker
and the head-mounted-display (HMD). Our study is in three-folds, a web study,
mobile device study and a VR study to evaluate the speed,login errors, usability of the
PATTERN authentication system in VR and handheld environment for comparison.
Lastly, results from the VR shoulder-surfing indicates that the VR implementation
of PATTERN has a high resistance, and the Login speed was comparable to that of
handheld mobile devices obtained from our research in Chapter 3.
• Chapter 5: In this chapter, we present a user study where our participants per-
formed a series of controlled tasks that require physical movements (such as grabbing,
rotating, dropping) that could be decomposed into unique kinesiological patterns
while we captured and monitored their hand, head, and eye gaze data within the
VR environment. The need for secure, transparent and non-intrusive identification
mechanisms in VR is important to facilitate users’ safe participation and secure ex-
perience. We present an analysis of the data and show that this data can be used
as a biometric discriminant of high confidence using machine learning classification
methods such as kNN or SVM, thereby adding a layer of security in terms of identi-
fication or dynamically adapting the VR environment to the users’ preferences. We
also performed a whitebox penetration testing with 12 attackers, some of whom were
physically similar to the participants. We are able to obtain an average identification
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confidence value of 0.98 from the actual participants’ test data after the initial study
and also a trained model classification accuracy of 97.2%. Penetration testing indi-
cates all attackers resulted in confidence values of less than 50%, although physically
similar attackers had higher confidence values.
• Chapter 6: In this chapter, we examined the purpose of our research and how dif-
ferent components and experiments fit together to attempt to answer the research
questions based on our hypotheses. The results and knowledge from these experi-
ments were used as a foundation for further evaluation as we evolved our research
through various user environments such as from mobile phone devices into virtual
reality devices. We concluded this chapter with a look into the possible limitations
and directions for future work of our research.
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Chapter 2
Review of Related Work
This chapter reviews background knowledge and related work of this thesis. We first intro-
duce Alphanumeric (Text-based) Passwords, especially the PIN and QWERTY implemen-
tation on mobile devices. Then, we introduce Graphical Passwords, 3D based Passwords,
and Biometric Authentication. Finally, we review the state-of-art.
2.1 Alphanumeric (Text-based) Passwords
Text-based passwords have been the cornerstone of authentication since the electronic
age. They are still the de-facto means of authentication on computer systems and other
embedded systems that require secure user interactions. Various standard security prac-
tices are in use to ensure text-based passwords maintain high entropy which may make
them also paradoxically, less secure, less usable and experience memorability issues [53, 78].
2.1.1 Physical mobile device keypad
The first generations of mobile devices had physical keypads as their main source of user
input. Since the first handheld mobile phone was demonstrated by Motorola in 1973 (see
Figure 1.1a), the problem of securing access to these mobile devices has been evolving.
The T9 keyboard originally developed by Tegic Communications was the main-stay of
user input, using the numeric PIN as the password. As at that time, most user inputs
involved inputting numeric values to make phone calls or respond to tone-based selections.
The importance of securing mobile devices especially mobile phones was not realized until
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these devices became ubiquitous and increasingly held more user information [82]. With
the debut of the first QWERTY mobile smartphone, the Nokia Communicator 9000 [98] in
1996, authentication of mobile devices came to the forefront of many manufacturer designs.
2.1.2 Virtual touch-screen mobile device keypad
Mobile devices such the Apple Newton MessagePad was introduced in 1993 as a produc-
tivity tool, it displayed an on-screen virtual keypad and required a stylus for interaction.
Similar devices such as the Palm Pilot was released in 1996 but were not quite widely
used. Full touch-screen mobile devices without auxiliary keypad support did not appear
mainstream until the release of the iPhone in 2007. The virtual keypad used on these fully
touch-screen based mobile devices had the same security and user problems as their phys-
ical counterparts and in some cases, as explained by [131] induced new forms of security
weaknesses.
2.2 Graphical Passwords
With the introduction by G. Blonder [14] of graphical authentication as an alternative to
textual knowledge-based authentication systems, graphical password authentication meth-
ods validate the user of the mobile device using certain visual representation displayed on
the mobile device screen. Furthermore, in graphical passwords, the natural ability of people
to process, retain and retrieve visual information [1] has been leveraged on to ensure the
selection and use of more secure password profiles [134, 13], similarly according to Biddle et
al. [13] studies have shown that the graphical nature of passwords does not entirely elimi-
nate the problems that plague the text-based password systems and the security offered by
these graphical schemes are somewhat inferior to text-based passwords [134]. In contrast,
recent studies by various researchers have shown methods that significantly improves the
security of graphical password to surpass the security level of text-based passwords and
also overcome various vulnerabilities that are unique to graphical passwords without com-
promising usability. Extensive studies have been done in the past in regards to graphical
passwords, and various papers categorize and examine about twelve schemes [2] while sug-
gesting usability guidelines for these designs [118]. In this context, three types of graphical
password systems have been identified and broadly categorized according to the memory
process involved; they are: Recognition based, Recall Based, Cued Recall based [13], and we
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shall explore the significance of each of these systems.
2.2.1 Recognition based graphical passwords
Recognition based graphical passwords systems task users with recognizing previously se-
lected images from among decoys to login. Proposed recognition-based systems use various
types of images, most notably: faces, random art, everyday objects, and icons [13], nu-
merous versions of this scheme such as Passfaces [108] and Deja vu [33] has been explored
by researchers and studies by [35] have shown that this scheme has a low theoretical pass-
word space compared to text-based password schemes, field studies conducted found that
users selected predictable passwords that could be successfully guessed, despite these is-
sues, studies by Dunphy and Nicholson [35] indicate that graphical password has 30% fewer
login errors than text-based password systems.
2.2.2 Recall based graphical passwords
Recall based graphical passwords systems are known to be a memory-intensive task due to
the fact that the secret diagram or pattern initially drawn by the user has to be entirely
remembered and reproduced; studies by Biddle and Chiasson [13] have shown that the task
of recalling the graphical password with this system is similar to text-based password, and
consequently having comparable theoretical password space with text passwords and the
entropy of patterns or diagrams is rather low [134]. Some popular implementations such
as Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [54] and Pass-Go [129, 25] which the mobile device PATTERN
lock is based on have been extensively studied.
2.2.3 Cued-recall based graphical passwords
Cued-recall based systems exploit various studies that conclude that the human memory
holds information that may be available yet inaccessible for retrieval without the proper
trigger or catalyst [4]. This system stands on the idea that pictorial indicators can simplify
the task of recall for a user [134, 28]. Some popular implementations such as PassPoint
[14, 145, 147], Cue Click Points (CCP) [27] and Cued Gazed ClickPoint (CGP) [61, 20,
101, 97] have been extensively studied.
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2.3 3D based Passwords
The three-dimensional environment is where humans naturally exist and operate, and as
mobile devices double in computing power bi-annually; not much literature exists in this
subject area but researchers have proposed various schemes of introducing 3D virtual en-
vironments into the authentication of mobile devices. Alsulaiman and Saddik [4] proposed
detailed steps in setting up such 3D virtual environments; meanwhile, very little research
has been done towards usability on actual everyday mobile devices. It has been suggested
that 3D passwords will eliminate all issues such as shoulder surfing, low entropy, brute force
attack and small theoretical password space suffered by graphical passwords and textbased
passwords respectively. Other researcher confirmed that the 3D environment allows for the
same security lapses that exist in the real world, such as hiding a key or password token
under a virtual foot mat; while Yu, I. Olade et al [151] and Odoh et al [100] argued that
best real-world practices will take place as the 3D password system proliferate, and a lot of
“story and role-playing” with interactive 3D objects will be commonplace, further studies
by [151, 103, 87] using virtual reality (VR) and Leap Motion [55] hardware support the
claims that the 3D password scheme will increase significantly the theoretical password
space. We strongly believe further research and field studies are needed to solidify the
practicality of this 3D password system.
2.4 Virtual Reality
In the area of Virtual Reality (VR) authentication, various research has been mainly fo-
cused on the What you are aspect of the authentication paradigm. Biometric authenti-
cation research [109, 119, 114] is very popular for VR because virtual reality inherently
exposes various biometric properties of the virtual reality user and these studies are gaining
popularity. However, there is growing hesitation in biometric authentication for privacy
and data safety reasons. This thesis focuses only on the well known knowledge-based au-
thentication in virtual reality systems.
A study by Yada et. al [148] using PIN authentication in augmented reality systems
found encouraging results even though the password entry time of this study was five times
higher than using PIN on a standard mobile phone. The researcher suggested that visual
cues and the reaction time of the Google Glass device were a contributing factor. A recent
study by George et al. [45] evaluated the security and usability of PATTERN and PIN
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within the VR environment. The study involved 25 participants, they found that usability
was comparable in performance to the mobile version of PIN and PATTERN. Although
their study was analytically sound, it did not evaluate the shoulder-surfing threat and
lacked a direct comparison to an actual mobile device study involving PATTERN and
PIN.
2.5 Biometric Authentication
Biometric authentication uses the distinctiveness of the user’s characteristics to determine
valid users. These characteristics could be either Physiological or Behavioural, and in
recent years various mobile device manufacturers have implemented some form of biomet-
ric authentication in their products. Currently, the most common form of physiological
biometric systems employ the use of fingerprints, iris patterns and facial recognition, like-
wise behavioural biometric systems employ the use of data captured as the user naturally
interacts with their mobile device in ways such as keyboard stroke patterns, gait, and
movement. Hence it is gaining popularity as the system for implicit, non-intrusive and
progressive authentication. While other knowledge-based methods and token-based meth-
ods require the users to remember or bring along their secret password tokens, biometric
systems have no memory load or carry along requirements. A study [29] found that 98%
and 75% of mobile device users consider fingerprint and facial authentication to be highly
secure.
2.5.1 Physiological Biometrics
Fingerprint
Fingerprints are outlines on the fingers that are composed of valleys and ridges. The
various fingerprint capture technology in use extracts unique minutiae features from the
user’s finger using a wide variety of imaging technologies. The extracted information is
stored for future authentication uses. The emergence of fingerprint technology into mobile
devices came with the release of the Fujitsu Mover F505i series [44, 43] in 2003, the Motorola
ATRIX [47] (see Figure 2.1a) android phone in 2011, and Apple TouchID [8] in 2013 (see
Figure 2.1b), thus brings this technology into the mobile phone mainstream market. These
phones required the user to place their password finger on the fingerprint sensor to perform
login and other authentication functions, its usage was seamless and unobtrusive.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.1: (a) Mobile Phone FingerPrint authentication: Motorola Atrix Fingerprint enabled
mobile phone. (b) TouchID FingerPrint System: Ergonomically designed finger sensor in IPhones.
(Images [51])
2.5.2 Behavioural Biometrics
Motion
Motion tracking in mobile devices has been made possible via detection by embedded
gyroscope and accelerometers. Gyroscopes are used to measure orientation and angular
velocity. This allows mobile devices to track the six degrees of freedom, whereas accelerom-
eters measure accelerative forces and changes in acceleration. Various implementation of
biometric authentication exists using these motion detection techniques and while many
have promising FAR and FRR, they still require active user participation. Fantana et. al
[38] demonstrated a mobile air signature biometric authentication concept, with the motion
path detected by the internal accelerometers or gyroscope and conclusively demonstrated
a 7% FAR and 10% FRR but the user interacting with the process was publicly visible
and not well suited for transparently recurrent biometric authentication. Other research
by [64, 40] demonstrated transparent actions such has phone from pocket, phone to head
movements emphasizing the biometric authentication factor of such activities with a high
degree of success.
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Gait
Gait recognition is the ability to uniquely discriminate the pattern of locomotion of a
person. This process is technically mature and has been implemented in many sectors using
machine vision [39] (MV), wearable sensors [59] (WS) and floor sensors (FS) [86, 57, 136].
Features like stride width, stride length, swag sway, foot-knee angles, and sound [18] have
been collectively used to measure gait and create a discriminating factor for identification
purposes in an unobtrusive manner. Mobile devices are essentially wearable sensors since
they are worn or carried on the user’s person. The placement of these mobile devices
determines what type of data can be acquired, and over the years research has been done
with the mobile devices placed in the pocket, a belt holster, a shirt chest pocket or held in
the hand [112]. In an experiment, Fantana et. al [38] compared the accuracy of the data
collected using an Android mobile phone and a professional camera-based high-end motion
tracking system [105] and found that the data was similar enough to be used for biometric
authentication purposes.
2.6 Biometric Authentication in the Virtual Reality Envi-
ronment
In the virtual reality environment, the head-mounted display (HMD) is a display device,
worn on the head that has a small optic display in front of the eyes (see Figure 2.2). It takes
up the entire field of view of the user or at least ensures that whatever the HMD is displaying
is always in the field of view of the user. The HMD has many uses in areas such as gaming,
aviation, engineering, and medicine. In recent years HMDs have been popular as XR
(Virtual, Augmented and Mixed Reality) devices. However, historically HMDs served as
auxiliary display devices and had limited mobility because they were tethered to a personal
computer (PC) and the security system of the PC served their usage. Recently, the XR
headsets are enabling a wide range of new opportunities for the users. These users need
to seamlessly authenticate their identity while visiting virtual shopping malls or virtually
playing games and making purchases, therefore having facial biometric authentication built
into HMDs is naturally a better solution. Fully mobile, untethered HMDs with independent
operating systems such as Microsoft HoloLens [85], Oculus-Go [99] and Lenovo’s Mirage
Solo [66] are mobile devices that could be more secured with facial biometric authentication.
To the best of our knowledge, we have not found any HMD devices that implement facial
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Figure 2.2: Head Mounted Display (HMD). The head-mounted displays used mainly for Virtual,
Augmented or Mixed Reality allows Periocular, Ocular Surface Vasculature (acrshortOSV), Iris and Retina
methods of biometric authentication due to its form-factor. (Images courtesy of Getty Images)
biometrics authentication. Studies by [88, 150, 124, 151] investigate different approaches to
authenticate HMD users, but they explored methods that did not use facial biometrics for
authentication. Our research indicates that the minimum hardware components required
to implement facial biometrics would be a visible light camera, an infrared emitter, and an
infrared camera. A few commercially available HMD such as the FOVE [41], HTC Vive-
Tobii Pro [132] and HTC Vive [3] (using a 7invensun upgrade kit, called aGlass) implement
infrared-based eye tracking, which allows users to have more immersible experiences using
the HMD because the users can navigate and control the device with the eyes.
Another advantage of the virtual reality environment is the ability to implement other
forms of biometric authentication schemes, which may involve the use of hand-held-controllers
(HHC) in addition to the HMD to track kinesiological movements that are biometrically
discernable. We envision an HMD device such as the newly released mobile Android-based
Oculus-Go [99] or Lenovo’s Mirage Solo [66] which allow full untethered movement being
used for this model of authentication. Traditionally identification has been a distinctively
obvious and sometimes intrusive process, and the users are certainly aware of these pro-
cesses. Transparent non-intrusive identification (TNI) is a process that attempts to extract
identifying information from the user’s activities or from attributes freely exposed by the
user while doing these activities, and therefore the system is able to continuously au-
thenticate the user. Most TNI systems in the current literature use behavioural patterns
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such as gait [72, 128], typing [83, 79, 115], eye movement [81, 36], touch [121, 42] and
brainwave EEG patterns [89, 120]. More recently, research and commercial systems have
harnessed users’ physical facial features and their finger biometric attributes to develop
TNI systems. Although physical biometric attributes from users’ face and fingers are more
accurate relative to behavioural biometrics, they are generally more intrusive to the users.
As an example, for a single-point fingerprint sensor to continuously authenticate the user,
the finger must pass frequently on the sensor, a requirement which might be considered
intrusive or disruptive for certain tasks or users. Alternatively, user based behavioural
attributes such as touch patterns, gait, eye movement have no restrictive requirements and
biometric data needed for identification can be captured transparently as the user types,
walks or touch the system during an activity.
In Sluganovic et al. [125], the authors developed an identification system that uses
visual stimulus to elicit reflexive eye movements based on fixation, saccade, and acceleration
cues, in a predictable manner that supports the extraction of reliable biometric features.
Using a gaze tracking device with a randomly generated stimulus, to prevent replay attacks,
the researchers achieved an equal error rate of 6.3%. Head movement and head pointing
studies have been performed by [69, 116, 68] as a means to support biometric identification.
Recently, an interesting research by Mustafa [87] et al. used only the sensors of an HMD
to track users’ behaviour patterns while they followed randomly appearing balls in a VR
environment while navigating only by head movements. They achieved an equal error rate
of 7%. Furthermore, other studies by Li et al. [69] recorded a high degree of accuracy in
identifying participants while they nodded when listening to music. Similarly, in a study
by Yi et al. [149], a set of six head-explicit gestures that included making a circle, triangle,
square and three kinds of lines were used to authenticate participants who used their nose
as a pointer to perform gestures. The study obtained identification accuracy as high as
92%.
We believe future research will be focused on implementing a seamless unobtrusive
biometric authentication mechanism for VR.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chatpter we reviewed background knowledge and related work of this thesis. We first
introduce background concepts such as alphanumeric passwords, especially the PIN and
QWERTY implementation on mobile devices. Then, we introduce graphical passwords, 3D
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based passwords, and biometric authentication. Finally, we review the state-of-art in bio-
metric authentication within the virtual reality environment because it allows us to explore
various user interaction methods. Biometric authentication has gained popularity as the
system for implicit, non-intrusive and progressive authentication because it has no memory
load or carry-along requirements. The miniaturization of advanced facial authentication
hardware systems into mobile devices such as mobile phones and head-mounted displays
(HMDs) used for VR/AR/MR has made biometric authentication seamless. This thesis
examine the possible application of these technologies within virtual reality and the most
recently released mobile phone devices on the market, while considering the challenges,
findings and advances within our scope of research.
Chapter 3
SemanticLock: A Story-based
Graphical Authentication System
3.1 Introduction
Mobile devices, being the de facto personal communication device, are ubiquitous within
our society [141]. We depend on these devices to store substantial amounts of confidential
information and perform activities such as emailing, social networking, personal internet
banking, and entertainment. All mobile devices manufactured in the last decade come
with a default set of authentication or login mechanisms. Research by Micallef et al. [80],
shows that over 64% of users chose not to secure or use an authentication system on their
mobile devices [50].
In general, research has shown that the behaviour, engagement, and interest of the users
have a major impact on the effective security level of their mobile devices, with many users
preferring to sacrifice security for convenience [21]. The uniformity of the distribution of
user passwords within an authentication system’s total password space is a practical mea-
sure of the usable level of security of that authentication system. Guessing or dictionary
attacks on user passwords are less successful when authentication systems have a uniform
distribution of user passwords. Studies by [22, 78] indicate that the distribution of text
passwords chosen by users effectively have a very low entropy, meaning that the actual
space of passwords most users choose from is much smaller than the total space available.
The above observation is known to affect prominent authentication systems such as PIN
[49, 60, 138] and PATTERN [152, 134, 49, 140] and has been extensively studied, with a
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(a) PIN (b) Pattern
Figure 3.1: Prominent mobile device authentication systems: The PIN and Pattern authentication
systems are popular with mobile devices that have GUI touchscreen-based systems.
large body of existing literature.
The PIN authentication system (see Figure 3.1(a)), which is a numeric display of num-
bers inputted by discrete touches on the screen and the PATTERN authentication system
(see Figure 3.1(b)), which is a ”grid-like” display of nodes whose password pattern is
selected by a continuous finger movement across the screen to connect the secret pass-
word nodes, are both plagued with numerous usage and security issues [1, 84, 7, 152].
Fortunately, the popularity of touch-screen based mobile devices allows for graphical au-
thentication techniques that offer possibilities of providing passwords that are effectively
stronger than text passwords. Recently, researchers have developed and studied various
graphical authentication systems [5, 141, 30, 10, 127] that take advantage of the inherent
human memorability properties and have attempted to mitigate factors such as low pass-
word distribution, low unlocking speed, medium-to-low entropy, and other biases, without
much success.
In this thesis, we present SemanticLock, a single factor graphical authentication method
for touchscreen mobile devices. Our solution works by providing the user with a way to
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.2: SemanticLock: (a) Default view for login and setup. (b) Login: the user drags two images
to meet the third image. In this case, Cup is dragged to the right side of Person (movement “A”),
then Blackboard is dragged to right the side of Cup (movement “B”). Login can be done with two quick
movements (A,B).
unlock their mobile devices by joining images via discrete and continuous finger move-
ments to create a semantically memorable story that represents a password (see Figure
3.2(a)). SemanticLock can create a strong memorable password with just two discrete fin-
ger movements allowing the user to construct a semantically meaningful password quickly
(see Figure 3.2(b)) from the provided images. In the SemanticLock scheme, a password
is a sequence of k images selected by the user to make a “story” from a single set of n >
k images. These non-intrinsically related images are placed in position p in one of four
locations around a pre-existing image. For mobile devices such as smartphones, six images
(n=6), allows for comfortable usage, yielding 14,400 possible passwords, which is similar
to a 4 digit PIN. Furthermore as previously mentioned, users drag and join at least three
of the provided images to construct their password ( see Figure 3.2(b) ), the semantic
story could be “I drink coffee and study”. The location of each image in the group con-
stitutes part of the password algorithm. Other password patterns are displayed in Figure
3.3(a) and Figure 3.3(b), these pictures are just examples and they can be customized
by the users. Additionally, Figure 3.3(c) shows how easy it is to create a new password.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.3: SemanticLock: (a) (person-breakfast-coffee: “I eat breakfast with coffee”). (b) (cat-
breakfast-dog: “cat shares meal with dog”) (c) (person-breakfast-dog: “I eat breakfast with my dog” )
Our technique strives to improve on memorability [25, 49] while significantly increasing
unlock speed, password distribution, and password entropy. To increase the entropy of
the selected password distribution, we ensured that we reduced password image bias by
performing three weeks of preliminary online study with the goal of eliminating dispropor-
tionately popular images and image pairs. In that study, our participants were required
to match intrinsically related password images from a set of 40 images that were initially
selected from diverse categories (see Figure 3.4). We subsequently obtained 6 “least intrin-
sically” related images from that study and used them during another 2 weeks password
creation study (see Figure 3.5(a,b)).
3.1.1 Challenges and proposed design approach
In designing the SemanticLock system, we set out to develop a system that was easy to
use, very secure and quick to login. Therefore our primary focuses were speed, ease of
use, memorability and high entropy. In addition, we wanted our solution to perform con-
sistently across all usage environments and situations our users may find themselves, and
to that end, our study involved scenarios such as sitting, walking unencumbered and en-
cumbered. We ensured that SemanticLock would require only two distinct swipes or finger
movements to construct a login password. We implemented a close proximity “sticky”
feature that visually highlights the two images that are in close proximity to each other
while the user is actively dragging one of the images. If the user releases this image it
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Figure 3.4: Related Icon Pairing Web Interface: Our online web page allowed our participants to
select 2 icons that they felt were related. They dragged these icons into the “pairboxes”.
automatically “glides” towards the closest image and “sticks” to it. This feature greatly
reduces errors caused by unsteady finger movements and increases overall login speeds.
SemanticLock also inherits both the discrete and continuous finger movement properties
of the PIN and PATTERN authentication system respectively. However, in contrast to
PATTERN, SemanticLock only requires two short swipes rather than one continuous long
swipe thereby minimizing the time needed to complete a login session or recover from errors
[113]. SemanticLock is inherently resistant to smudge attacks because the location of its
passwords tokens on the screen is irrelevant to the creation of the password, whereas the
PIN and PATTERN authentication systems are susceptible to smudge attacks [49, 152].
Furthermore, to assess our system and get a comparative evaluation, we selected the two
most widely used graphical authentication systems as control and conducted a user study
over a three weeks period to compare our SemanticLock authentication system against
PATTERN, PIN, and PIN-Shuffled authentication systems (see Figure3.1). As such we
have formulated the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis H1: We expect that the results obtained from the SemanticLock system will
be comparatively similar or relatively close to those of the PATTERN authentication
system, despite the fact that most of our users have prior inherent knowledge and
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.5: SemanticLock Web-based Password Creator: (a) Default view of icon placement. (b)
Creating Password: the user drags the “cheese” to meet the stationary “bottle” icon. In this case,
“cheese” is also dragged to the right side of “bottle”. Lastly, a three-icon password is shown (see black
circle). (c) PATTERN password Web Interface : Participants were requested to create various
pattern passwords.
familiarity with the PATTERN authentication system.
Hypothesis H2: We also expect the PIN system to firmly supersede the SemanticLock
system and be closer in performance to the PATTERN authentication system.
Hypothesis H3: We predict that the SemanticLock will supersede the PIN-SHUFFLE
in regards to unlock speed. Both authentication systems are inherently resistant to
smudge attacks.
Within the study, we utilized the dataset we collected during the initial three-week
period, and we showed that while SemanticLock can be practically more secure than the
PIN and PATTERN authentication systems (see section 3.4.1). Its usability performance
was also better than the PIN and similar to PATTERN under normal circumstances (see
section 3.4.5).
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 3.2, we describe our method-
ology in more detail, such as the preliminary web-based studies, the graphical password
schemes that we evaluated during the mobile device study, and our experimental design.
In section 3.3, we present our data sources and data collection models. In section 3.4 and
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3.5, we discuss issues and findings and present our results. In section 3.4.1, we explored
the password strength and practical entropy levels of the PATTERN and SemanticLock
authentication systems. In section 3.6 we mention limitations and conclusion of the study.
3.2 Methodology
We employed two strategies in an attempt to achieve the desired features and functions
of our previously described SemanticLock system. Pre-system development analysis and
experiments are required in order to derive initial icon sets. Therefore two studies were
conducted, a web-based study and a mobile device study. Both studies are discussed below.
3.2.1 Web-based Study
A major aspect of our research is determining the types of icons that will be used in our
SemanticLock authentication system, these icons were expected to increase the practical
password entropy evaluations of the system (see section 3.4.1). A web-based approach
was the most practical method of collecting large amounts of data from a large group of
participants. We used the University email system and social media platforms to generate
awareness for the experiment, which resulted in a large response. Additionally, a similar
web interface was created to collect samples of PATTERN passwords from the same group
of participants (see Figure 3.4 and 3.5).
Software and Web Technology
For this aspect of the study, we utilized multiple web-based interfaces that were designed
using HTML5, PHP and MySQL database back-end technologies. This allowed us to
implement icon drag-n-drop actions and graphical line drawing functions that are common
on touch-screen based devices (see Figure 3.6). While web-based experiments are harder
to control than in a laboratory or supervised field experiments [13], this channel of data
collection met our requirements and offers numerous advantages.
Goals
As part of our goals in the design of our SemanticLock system, our initial intention is to
avoid any implicitly induced biases in the researcher’s selection of the password icons that
may lower the entropy or reduce the achievable password space [31]. In general, security
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Figure 3.6: Web Icon pairing flowchart: Software Process flow of web-based Icon
Pairing
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experts have observed that an authentication system’s theoretical password space is never
optimally achieved during practical usage [23, 48, 15, 78], and there is also a need to
determine the actual practical password space that supports the ecological validity of such
an authentication system. We defined two stages of the experiment to achieve the above-
stated objectives and implemented these stages with two different groups of participants.
The output of the analysis of the dataset collected in the first stage was utilized during the
second stage. Our purpose for collecting a series of PATTERN password data during stage
2 was to evaluate the distribution and the popularity of certain PATTERN passwords, and
also eliminate these common passwords from our PATTERN password selection during the
Mobile Device study (see Section 3.2.2).
Participants
For Stage 1: As explained in section 3.2.1, we engaged 372 participants, many were
recruited via campus-wide email and social media groups, most were university students,
but with diverse age ranges. We also collected other demographic information such as
academic background, computer skills and their experience with mobile devices or authen-
tication systems, but this data was not used in the research analysis.
For Stage 2: We engaged 184 participants, many were recruited via campus-wide email
and social media groups, 70% were students within the same university campus and the
rest were non-students. Our web portal included a 3 minute training video, and each
participant was encouraged to watch the video before attempting to create passwords. We
advised our participants to create at least 10 passwords each. We also collected other
demographic information such as academic background, computer skills and experience
with mobile devices or authentication systems, but this data was not used in the research
analysis.
Acquisition of independent password icons and common PATTERN Passwords
During Stage 1, our initial process was to provide a set of 40 icons that were drawn from
various categories and genres. We explicitly avoided icons that had major gender-oriented
colours, and icons with cultural, national or religious relevance. Our participants were
then presented with a web-based interface that displayed these icons on a 10 x 4 grid (see
Figure 3.4), with each icon randomly positioned in different grid-cells during every selection
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session to prevent locational bias. Participants were required to create 10 sets of “icons-
pairs” that they believed were related by dragging these icons into the provided pairboxes,
the reason or logic of this relationship was based on their discretion. Each participant was
allowed multiple iterations. We analyzed the 3708 collected pair-datasets to extract 6 icons
that were the least intrinsically related. These “non-intrinsically” related icons were used
in the next stage of the experiment.
Data collection for the evaluation of practical password space
During Stage 2, our primary goal was to quantify the effect of a participant’s choice on the
security of passwords chosen. Every authentication scheme has entropy and the strength
of such entropy is determined by the probability distribution associated with the password
space (see section 3.4.1 & 3.4.4). Ideally, this distribution is approximately uniform. At
this stage of our experiment, we presented a SemanticLock web-based interface displaying
the six derived non-intrinsically related password icons on a 9 x 6 celled grid to our par-
ticipants (see Figure 3.5(a) ). Our participants were required to create several semantic
passwords with the password icons by dragging a chosen icon to the left, top, right or
bottom position of an associated stationary icon (see Figure 3.5(b)). Secondly, the par-
ticipants were also shown a 3x3 PATTERN web interface (see Figure 3.5 (c)) and were
requested to draw 10 different patterns. The web-interface ensured that the user could
not repeat patterns within the same session or create patterns with less than 3 nodes. We
excluded the PATTERN passwords collected from this stage in our experiment if they exist
in the set of carefully pre-decided pattern passwords that met our node count and com-
plexity criteria. At the conclusion of this stage we had successfully collected data about
common positional layout of SemanticLock passwords, and also identified a set of common
PATTERN passwords that would be excluded from our final Mobile Device study.
3.2.2 Mobile Device Study
Our mobile device study made use of the Android platform. We developed a mobile version
(see Figure 3.1(a) and Figure 3.2(a) ) of the interface that was used during our web-based
study (see Figure 3.5). We also developed Android versions of the Pattern and PIN lock
authentication systems since these authentication systems would be our baseline or control
conditions for this study due to their popularity and the large body of research literature
about their performances. We developed an additional application to help us convey the
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testing and survey to our participants in a uniform and consistent way. The process flow of
this application is shown in Figure 3.7. It allowed participants to view an initial training
video, assigned a unique participant ID that allowed us to correlate data across Login
techniques and also presented the pre-survey and post-survey questionnaires in the proper
sequences while implementing the Latin square approach to counterbalance the order of
the techniques (see Figure 3.8).
Goals
Our objective during this three-week study, which involved participants in an indoor envi-
ronment, was to collect both qualitative and quantitative data which would provide insight
into our participant’s perception of the likeability, usability, memorability and login speed
of the 3 authentication approaches:
• SemanticLock
• Pattern Lock
• PIN
The prototypes, shown in (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2), met our goal of ensuring com-
patibility with Android 6.0 and above while meeting the requirements of working on phone
and tablet form-factors. The training mode option allowed users to receive adequate train-
ing and practice before the actual testing. During the testing, a participant’s activities
such as touches, password tokens, strokes, pauses, timings, aborts, and errors were logged
for further analysis.
Participants
We recruited 63 participants from a local university. The data from our pre-testing sur-
vey reveals that 51% of the participants were between the ages of 17 to 27 and all our
participants were right-handed. All were active users of iPhone (31%) or Android (66%)
mobile phones. 55% of them used a phone with a fingerprint sensor, while 17% used the
PIN password, 14% used Pattern password and, the remaining did not use authentication.
50% of our participants claim the input hand posture they preferred to use depends on the
situation and the app in question; 27% claimed they preferred to use two hands to operate
their mobile devices. All participated voluntarily without any financial remuneration.
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Figure 3.7: Mobile Device Study: Flowchart showing the software flow process for the
Mobile Device study.
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(a) User Study Admin App (b) User Survey Question (c) Post Test In-App Survey (d) Post Test Survey
Figure 3.8: Survey App Framework: (a) The survey framework app allowed us to provide a consistent
process to all participants. (b) pre-test survey collected user demographics and preferences. (c) Post-test
survey specific to the system just tested. (d) The Post-test general survey, to collect user’s overall opinions
Experimental Design
Our goal was to compare the three main techniques and their interactions with other
independent variables. To do this, we followed a within-participants design. Below are the
variables we are tracking:
The independent variables are :
• Technique
• Device Form-Factor
• Physical Posture
• Hand Posture
The dependent variables are :
• Login Speed
• Pre-Login Delay Time
• Error Rate
• User usability and acceptance
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(a) Seated (b) Walking (c) Walking Encumbered
Figure 3.9: Participants in the Study: (a) Participant performing a Seated Test using the Tablet.
(b) The user is walking unencumbered. (c) Encumbered posture while using the single-hand main thumb
input posture.
Technique: Our experiment compared three techniques which are the PIN, PATTERN,
and SemanticLock authentication systems. The task required of each participant was
to enter the password tokens as fast as possible during each session, while we implicitly
collected and tracked data and meta-data for future analysis. We assigned password tokens
for each technique so that each participant would use a sufficiently strong password that is
properly distributed within the space of possible passwords. We attempted to ensure that
the password tokens given for each technique had relatively the same password strength.
Device Form-Factor: Mobile devices are available in various dimensions. We performed
our study with a 5.2” LG Nexus 5X phone and a 10.2” Google Pixel C tablet. The tablet
was only used during the Seated session (Figure 3.9 (a)) of the experiment, while the LG
phone was used for all sessions (Figure 3.9 ( b),(c )).
Physical Posture: Studies show that the physical posture of users has an effect on the
way they use their mobile devices [90, 95, 91]. Recent studies have shown that walking
encumbered or unencumbered and operating a mobile device had significant effects on the
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(a) One-handed thumb (b) two-handed index finger (c) two-handed both thumbs
Figure 3.10: Input Hand Postures: The most common hand postures when using mobile devices.
These postured were tested during the Study. Input postures involving two hands are common due to
mobile devices that have larger screens.
usage pattern of mobile devices [126, 93, 107]. Therefore in this study, we included 3
physical postures:
Seated: This posture required participants to sit on a comfortable chair and operate
the mobile device on a table and could use one or two hands (see Figure 3.9(a)).
Walking Unencumbered: This posture implied that the person operating the mo-
bile device was also walking but without carrying any other objects with their hands or
arms (see Figure 3.9(b)).
Walking Encumbered: This posture took place when participants would operate a
mobile device while carrying other items such as books or bags with their hands or arms
(see Figure 3.9(c)).
Hand Posture: Hand posture defines how a mobile phone is held when in use by the
user. There are 3 prominent input postures: one-handed preferred thumb, two-handed index
finger and two-handed both thumbs (see Figure 3.10). With the advent of larger mobile
phone screens, many users have had to change from the one hand input posture to the
two-handed input posture [93, 107]
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Task and Procedures
Our first step was to inform the participants about the confidentiality of their supplied
information and to explain the purpose of the project and the tasks they would need to
do. We provided a three-minute training video to each participant (see Figure 3.8a), after
which they were allowed to practice each technique a couple of times. They practiced the
creation of a password and use the password to login to the mobile device. We emphasized
the need for a speedy and accurate login during the actual testing phase.
Week 1 (First Phase): Each participant was required to answer a pre-test question-
naire before commencing the test (see Figure 3.8b). We allowed each participant to choose
password tokens for each technique from our supplied list. If the participant entered the
wrong password, the application alerted them to enter the correct password again. The
average time for participants to complete all techniques (including questionnaires) was 4
minutes. The experiment finished with a Likert questionnaire (see Figure 3.8c) that col-
lected qualitative data about the participants’ perceived usability, error-handling, security
and likeability of each technique. This week’s session was a seated session and the par-
ticipants used the techniques on the LG mobile phone and the Google tablet. The main
independent variables were technique (PIN, Pattern, and SemanticLock) and mobile form
factor (phone and tablet). Each participant had to enter a total of 9 passwords per session,
3 for each technique and participants were allowed a 60-second rest in between techniques
to minimize fatigue if there was any.
Week 2 (Second Phase): In the second phase, which occurred a week after, we ex-
plored the memorability aspects of the three techniques. We asked the same participants
to recall the passwords they had used for each technique the previous week. During this
session, we tracked error-rates, type of error, action-delay times and login speed required
for our future analysis.
Week 3 (Third Phase): We recalled the participants for a third session that required
them to perform login activities while walking around a predefined path within an indoor
environment. We followed a procedure similar to the one used by [95, 93] in which they
examined the effect of mobility and encumbrance on participants using both one and two-
handed interactions on touchscreen mobile devices. The walking speed was paced by a
researcher (see Figure 3.11) who used a metronome to ensure a proper walking speed was
maintained. After the walking test (see Figure 3.9(b)), each participant undertook the
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Figure 3.11: Pacing the user: A Pacesetter (Dr. I.A Olade) (right) keeping the partic-
ipant (left) at a steady walking pace with the help of metronome software during a login
test.
encumbrance test, which required each participant to walk along a path at a paced speed
carrying two nylon bags containing a 100cl plastic bottle while unlocking the device using
each technique (see Figure 3.9(c)). The decision to use nylon bags was informed by the
research done by Ng et al. [95]. In this phase, we sought to investigate the effect of mobility
and encumbrance on the login speed, memorability and input errors while assessing the
techniques with the 3 commonly used input postures presented in [107].
3.3 Data Collection and Measurement
We collected data for a number of dependent variables and used this data to evaluate the
techniques.
3.3.1 Pre-Login Delay time: Memorability and Usability
Pre-login delay is the elapsed time between when the participant indicated that they were
ready to start unlocking the device and the actual time they entered the password. This
data provides a view into evaluating the memorability and usability of the system. Studies
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by Stobert et al. [127, 144] defined a direct relationship between memorability and pre-login
delay time. We analyze this data to quantify the level of memorability and usability.
3.3.2 Login Speed
The time period used to complete each trial of the login process for a technique was
recorded. This measurement recorded both successful and failed trials. Login speed was
tracked from the moment a participant starts password token entry until the entry was
completed successfully.
3.3.3 Error Rate
The error rate was measured as a percentage of failed login attempts to the total number of
attempts required to complete the technique’s session. The number of failed login attempts
during a trial did not affect the number of trials that constituted a complete session.
3.3.4 Subjective Data
We collected pre-test, in-test, and post-test surveys via an electronic questionnaire (see
Figure 3.8 (b,c,d)). The questions focused on ease of use, perception of speed, the likelihood
of adoption, error recovery, and interface usability. We implemented the questionnaire in
electronic form and used 5-point Likert questions for some aspects of the questionnaire.
3.4 Results
The results from this study are in two folds, the data collected from the web-based interface
was used to determine security factors for both the SemanticLock and PATTERN, whereas
the data collected from the mobile device interface, which are quantitative and qualitative
in nature was used to determine usability factors. Our analytical processes are discussed
below.
3.4.1 Authentication Password Space, Security and Entropy Analysis
With many authentication systems, users tend to choose passwords that are easy to re-
member, meaning that they do not select their password uniformly from the whole space
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of possible passwords, but instead show a higher probability to choose from certain sub-
sets. For example, PIN users often choose dates that have some significance to them as
passwords. The degree of randomness of passwords practically chosen by users is an impor-
tant factor in determining the security of an authentication system. The level of password
randomness is an important factor in determining the uniqueness of a security token. The
term entropy has been widely examined in the various existing literature and there exists
a large body of work [23, 32] evaluating the entropy of alphanumeric text-based passwords
and PIN passwords. Entropy was introduced by C. Shannon [122] (see equation 3.1) as a
measure of uncertainty of choices. Given a discrete random variable (χ) where N is the
total number of observed events and ρi is the probability of the i event, while
∑
denotes
the sum over the variable’s possible values, and its denoted by H1(χ), which is
H1(χ) =
N∑
i=1
−ρi log2 ρi (3.1)
The quality of alphanumeric password policies can be measured in terms of entropy
(using combinatorial considerations), an analogous measure for graphical authentication
systems is certainly desirable. However, various studies, such as those by Uellenbeck et al
[134], Tupsamudre et al [133] has explored Pattern authentication security and observed
that its practical password space is significantly less than its theoretical password space
(see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Theoretical Password Space values for Authentication System
Authentication System Theoretical Space
SemanticLock (3x2)∗∗ 14,440
PIN (6-digits) 1,000,000
Pattern (3x3) 389,112
PIN (4-digits) 10,000
**for theoretical password space value of the SemanticLock
The primary attack we are considering is the brute force guessing attack. The objective
of a guessing attack is to achieve a high number of match success within a fixed number
of attempts, leveraging the knowledge of user password preferences. Studies by [134, 7]
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proposed an algorithm called partial guessing entropy [15] (α-guesswork ), which depicts
the success rates as a function of the password distribution space. We use this algorithm
to evaluate the security of SemanticLock with respect to guessing attacks.
In order to use α-guesswork, we need to have an estimate of the distribution of user-
selected passwords. While the PIN password distribution can be estimated based on leaked
password databases or surveys, it is more difficult to obtain this type of data for graphical
password systems such as PATTERN and SemanticLock. Instead, we use a Markov model
from [134], which is based on the idea that the subsequent token in a password, such as
the next node in a PATTERN system, is dependent on the previous token. Therefore,
with a given sequence of password tokens, we must determine from the initial probabilities
P (c1, ..., cm) and the subsequent transitional probabilities P (ci|c1, ..., cn−1). This data was
collected as part of our online survey.
3.4.2 Introduction and Implementation of Markov Modeling
Authentication strength is built on the difficulty level of predicting the future tokens in a
password series of a randomly changing system. The Markov chain attempts to model a
system state as it changes through time. As mentioned earlier, in order to use the Markov
model we must determine the initial probabilities P (c1, ..., cm) and the subsequent transi-
tional probabilities P (ci|c1, ..., cn−1). In this study, we performed a series of analyses based
on Markov chains to quantify the security of the Pattern and SemanticLock authentication
system using the data we collected during the online survey. We followed closely the data
preparation process described in [134], with our dataset split into K=7 disjointed subsets
of S1, ..., S7 and using S1 − S6 as the training set and S7 as the test set. For PATTERN we
used n-gram value of n=3 as described in [134], while for SemanticLock we determined that
the most common passwords consist of 3 icon sets or subsets (see Figure 3.12) , therefore
we also used n=3 during the Markov analysis. Then, we enumerated all valid patterns,
using a recursive algorithm. Finally, we match the output guesses against the test set,
recording how many guesses existed in the test set that was provided. Our above methods
were used to obtain the results discussed in section 3.4.4 .
P (c1, ..., cm) = P (c1, ..., cn−1) ·
m∏
i=n
P (ci|ci−n+1, ..., cn−1) (3.2)
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Figure 3.12: Most common SemanticLock Icon-Pair patterns : A list of the most common
SemanticLock “Icon-Pair” patterns in our user dataset. This was used to select the n-gram value for our
Markov model analysis.
3.4.3 SemanticLock Web-based Data Analysis
The data collected from the participants during stage 2 of the web-based study was ana-
lyzed to confirm that our icon selection method was valid and to derive statistics needed
for our Markov model.
Password Icon distribution:
Frequency analysis was performed on the SemanticLock password data sets collected. Each
SemanticLock password is made up of unique icons selected from the 6 initial password
icons. From our dataset of 1825 semantically created passwords, our analysis suggests that
the choice of each of the six password icons is uniformly distributed. (see Figure 3.13(a))
Password Icon-pair position distribution:
Password icons are used to create semantic passwords by dragging a selected password icon
to a “resting position” next to the stationary password icon. This “resting position” could
either be the left, top, right or bottom of a stationary password icon (see Figure 3.5(a)
and (b)). We analyzed the collected positional data sets to determine if our participants
displayed a bias in their choice of “resting positions”. Our analysis indicated that the
participant selection of “resting positions” was fairly uniform with a small bias towards
the “top or right position“, which is somewhat expected from predominantly right-handed
users ( see Figure 3.13b).
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.13: SemanticLock Data Analysis: (a) The chart indicates the icon distribution is uniform
(standard deviation SD= 0.4). Users did not have any affinity to any particular password icon. (b) Drag-To
Positions: This chart shows the analysis of the dragged Icon drag-to position on the stationary icon.
Participants indicated an affinity for positioning password icons at the “top” position of the stationary
password icon. Further analyses indicate that password icon positioning is uniformly distributed (standard
deviation SD= 0.2).
Password Icon pair distribution:
As each semantic password is composed of two or more sets of password icons, we pre-
processed the collected data sets and decomposed semantic passwords that consist of more
than two password icons into two pairs of password icons and performed frequency analysis
on these password icon pairs. All pairs were roughly equi-likely (see Figure 3.14). Our
analysis further shows a uniform distribution which indicates a strong password entropy.
3.4.4 Password Strength Evaluation
One objective for data collection during the Web study was to quantify and compare the
results obtained from the PATTERN and SemanticLock system (see Figure 3.5). The
metrics we obtained for pattern password evaluation were Pattern-length, Stroke-length,
Intersections, Start/End points were similar to findings reported by [134, 7, 23, 49]. The
data collected and our analysis was highly similar to those reported in past studies by
[9, 23, 134, 16]. Implementing an accurate password strength comparison of the PATTERN
and SemanticLock requires identifying metrics that are common to both systems or can
be effectively generalized to serve our requirements. We determined that metrics such as
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Figure 3.14: Icon-Pair selection Analysis : The distribution of “Icon-Pair” selection
within the password icon data sets. The chart shows a “uniform” distribution, indicating
a strong password entropy.
Start/End points and guess-ability resistance are best suited for our comparison needs.
Table 3.2: Start/End point High values and Standard Deviation SD
System StartPoint StartPoint SD EndPoint EndPoint SD
PATTERN 43.7% 12.8 30.9% 7.8
SemanticLock 21.8% 4.3 11.1% 4.1
The table shows that SemanticLock performed better overall.
Password start and end Points
The uniform distribution of start/end points in a password system is an indication of high
entropy and password strength [134, 7, 9]. Analysis of the Pattern passwords collected
during the online study showed that 43.7% of our participants started their password
from the top-leftmost node, making their starting points highly predictable (see Figure
3.15(a)). Unsurprisingly, participants chose the bottom right node as their end destination
30.9% of the time (see Figure 3.15(c)). These results are similar to findings observed by
[134, 147, 23]. Analysis of the SemanticLock passwords collected during the online study
shows the uniform distribution of start points (see Figure 3.15(b)), with the largest value
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(a) Pattern Start points (b) SemanticLock Start points (c) Pattern End points (d) SemanticLock End points
Figure 3.15: Start/End points comparison: Percentage representation of the Start and End points.
of 21.8% located at the lower-rightmost cell, with a End point (see Figure 3.15(d)) of 11.1%
located at the center of the grid (see Table 3.2). SemanticLock exhibited a lower level of
bias and more uniform distribution of participant password Start and End points.
Password Guessability
The results of our guessing attack evaluation are displayed in Figure 3.16. In this fig-
ure, we depict guessing attack data for real user passwords, the PIN (4 digits) data was
from a study by [15], and the PATTERN and SemanticLock data was collected during
our web study. It can be seen that SemanticLock is more resistant to guessing attacks.
For example, to compromise 20% (i.e α = 0.2) of the password space of the PATTERN
authentication system, it requires 114 attempts, while SemanticLock requires 346 attempts
and PIN required less than 50 attempts. Additionally, to compromise 50% (i.e α = 0.5)
of PATTERN, it requires 438 attempts, while SemanticLock requires 2422 attempts and
PIN required less than 100 attempts.
Our results are shown in Table 3.3 along with partial entropy estimates from other stud-
ies. We computed entropy estimates for α=10%, 20% and 50%, higher values of α for non-
uniform distributions reflect a higher entropy factor. From Table 3.3, we note that Semanti-
cLock has a better performance factor than all the “practical” PATTERN(Tupsamudre,Aviv,Uellenbeck,Olade)
and RealUser PIN (4 digit) estimates, with its α values significantly higher than the pass-
word strength of a uniformly distributed 3-digit Random PIN.
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Figure 3.16: Password Guessability Analysis : Guessing entropy (α-guesswork ) comparison of the
guessing resistance of Random PIN (4 digits), PATTERN and SemanticLock. The graph of SemanticLock
shows high resistance to guessing attacks.
Table 3.3: Partial Guessing Entropy Comparison: This chart compares partial entropy estimates
of several distributions and different values for the (α-guesswork )
Distribution α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.5
SemanticLock 9.89 10.26 11.7
PATTERN 3x3 (Olade) 7.10 7.86 9.98
RealUser PIN (4 digits) [58, 17, 15] 5.19 7.04 10.08
PATTERN 3x3 (Tupsamudre et.al) [133] 5.80 6.95 9.86
PATTERN 3x3 (Aviv et.al) [9] 6.59 6.99 8.93
PATTERN 3x3 (Uellenbeck et.al) [134] 8.72 9.10 10.90
3.4.5 Quantitative Results
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to determine whether there are any statistically
significant differences between the means of three or more independent groups or systems.
ANOVA checks the impact of one or more factors by comparing the means of different
samples. In this research, apart from using one-way and two-way ANOVA, we also per-
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formed a Tukey Test, which is a single-step multiple comparison procedure to determine
exactly where those differences lie.
Login Speed
The mean values of the login speed of each technique and other independent factors are
shown in Table 3.4. The results show that the SemanticLock performed better than the
other techniques across device form factors and postures. SemanticLock was superior in
performance to PIN across all independent variables. There was a statistically significant
difference between the techniques login speed as determined by the one-way ANOVA test
(F(4,535) = 170.44, p < .001). A Tukey post hoc test revealed that SemanticLock (807.06
± 167.23 ms, p < .001) was significantly faster than Pattern and PIN (both p < .001).
Table 3.4: Average login speed across posture and technique
Independent variables Pattern PIN SemanticLock
Seated (Tablet) 785 1516 590
Seated (Phone) 825 1570 652
Walking Thumb 1135 1885 853
Walking Index 916 1395 708
Walking 2 Thumbs 945 1208 768
Walking-E Thumb 1175 1736 917
Walking-E Index 800 1474 910
Walking-E 2 Thumbs 873 1147 655
Note: Walking-E = Walking Encumbered
Differences across Device Form Factors
As stated earlier, we used two different types of device form-factors during the “seated”
sessions (a Nexus 5 phone and a Google Pixel C tablet). Results of a two-way ANOVA
test show that there was no significant effect of device form-factor ( F(1,530) = .003, p =
.995) on login speed across techniques. Furthermore there was no significant interaction
effect between device form-factor and login technique (F(4,530) = 1.208, p = .306), (see
Figure 3.17).
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Figure 3.17: Login Speed compared on Device Form-factor indicates SemanticLock performed better on
both device form factors.
Differences across Physical Postures
Our participants assumed three different physical postures (seated, walking and walking-
encumbered). Results of a two-way ANOVA test show that there was no significant effect
of posture ( F(2,1485) = 1.189, p = .305) on login speed across Login techniques (see
Figure 3.18). However, there was a significant interaction effect between physical posture
and login technique ( F(8,1485) = 3.302, p = .001), with participants having a faster speed
using the SemanticLock method while walking encumbered.
Figure 3.18: Login Speed: Login Speed compared on Physical Posture indicate that SemanticLock
had a faster login speed when participants were walking unencumbered and walking encumbered.
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Figure 3.19: Login Speed while Walking Encumbered: Shows that SemanticLock performed better
than the PIN and Pattern authentication systems while participants walked encumbered.
Further analysis of the data with the seated posture data excluded and using a two-way
ANOVA test to examine the effect of walking posture (unencumbered or encumbered) and
login technique on login speed show that there was no significant effect of walking posture
( F(1,950) = 1.757, p = .185) on login speed across login techniques (see Figure 3.19).
Furthermore, there was no significant interaction effect between walking posture and login
technique ( F(4,950) = 1.660, p = .157).
Differences across Input Hand Postures
Our participants while walking either unencumbered or encumbered assumed three dif-
ferent input hand postures (OneHandThumb, TwoHands2Thumbs, OneHandOtherIndex )
during the testing of the Login Technique (see Figure 3.10). Results of a two-way ANOVA
test conducted to examine the effect of Input Hand posture and login technique on login
speed shows that there was a significant effect of Input Hand posture ( F(2,945) = 59.318, p
< .001) on login speed across login techniques (see Figure 3.20). Furthermore, there was a
significant interaction effect between input hand posture and login technique ( F(8,945) =
2.973, p = .003). A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the TwoHand2Thumb posture (1357
ms, p < .001) was statistically significantly faster than OneHandThumb, but there was no
statistically significant difference between the TwoHand2Thumb and OneHandOtherIndex
posture (1360 ms, p = .965).
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Figure 3.20: Login Speed based on Input Hand Posture for each Technique.
Pre-Login Delay Time
Our participants experience a time delay between when the trial started and when an initial
action or interaction was made. This pre-login delay time gives an indication of familiarity,
memorability or ease of use of the techniques. SemanticLock had the lowest pre-login delay
time across all hand input postures (see Figure 3.21), the ANOVA test results showed a
significant main effect for hand input posture, (F(2,930) = 9.877, p < 0.05) , where the
OneHandThumb had a significantly lower pre-login time than the Twohand2Thumb but
there was no significant difference with the OneHandOtherIndex (p= 0.624).
Error Rates
A two-way ANOVA test was conducted to examine the error rate for each technique. There
was no significant effect of interaction by these independent variables on the error rate.
Furthermore, the analysis showed that the error rate was lowest for all hand input postures
when using SemanticLock and there was no significant difference in the error rate of the
SemanticLock technique (p = .925 ). Additionally, results show that the PIN had the
lowest error rates when walking unencumbered (see Figure 3.22).
It should be noted that data from the participants’ ”seated” sessions were excluded
from this walking analysis. Error rates across all techniques indicate that participants in
Chapter 3. SemanticLock: A Story-based Graphical Authentication System 51
Figure 3.21: Pre-Login Delay Time based on Input Hand Posture for each Technique.
the seated position had the lowest error rates while the participants using two-handed both
thumbs while walking unencumbered had the highest error rates (see Figure 3.29). Error
rates classified by techniques show that Pattern (18%) had the highest error rates, followed
by SemanticLock (7%), and PIN(3.5%) (see Figure 3.23).
Figure 3.22: Error Rates: Error rate based on walking across all techniques.
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Figure 3.23: Error rates for each Technique
3.4.6 Qualitative Results
The results are based on a 5-point Likert scale questionnaire and subsequent user rankings
of the three techniques. Each participant prior to the experiment answered an electronic
pre-test survey which we used to obtain demographics, personal information, and mobile
device user experience. The Likert scaled questions were answered after the trial of each
technique to collect their subjective preferences. At the end of the trials, the user ranking
of all techniques was collected (see Figure 3.24). The data we collected was analyzed using
the Friedman test and we performed post hoc analysis with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
with Bonferroni correction (p= 0.05/3 = 0.017) of those that are statistically significant.
In the questionnaire, we probed aspects of the users’ experience with regards to the three
login techniques, and their responses were analyzed.
Likeability
Post hoc analysis indicated that there was no significant difference in how well participants
liked the techniques (see Figure 3.24).
Speed
Our participant‘s experience with each technique’s speed shows there was a statistically
significant perceived difference in speed depending on the technique (χ2(2) = 18.321, p
< 0.001) (see Figure 3.25). Post hoc analysis indicated that there were no significant
differences of speed between PIN and Pattern trials (Z = -2.101, p = 0.036) or between
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Figure 3.24: User LIKERT ranking survey: Our LIKERT based qualitative test indicates that the
SemantickLock performed better with all the evaluated factors (see legend A to G). [ A: Hard to Recall, B:
Best GUI , C: Easy to Recall , D: Use In Future , E: Liked the Most , F: Easy to Use , G: Faster Login ]
PIN and SemanticLock trials (Z = -1.560, p = 0.119). However, there was a significant
difference in speed between Pattern and SemanticLock trials (Z = -3.573, p < 0.001), with
SemanticLock perceived to be significantly faster.
Usability
There was a significant difference in perceived ease of use of the technique (χ2(2) = 14.22,
p = 0.001). Post hoc analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between
the PIN and Pattern (Z = -1.672, p = 0.94) or between the PIN and SemanticLock (Z =
-1.628, p = 0.103) (see Figure 3.26). However, there was a significant increase in perceived
ease of use between Pattern and SemanticLock (Z = -3.140, p = 0.002).
Positive Feedback
Participant‘s experience with the feedback for each technique also showed that there was
a significant difference (χ2(2) = 17.179, p < 0.001) (see Figure 3.27). There were signif-
icant differences between Pattern and SemanticLock as well as SemanticLock and PIN;
SemanticLock was ranked favorably in both cases.
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Figure 3.25: Perceived Login Speed: A comparison of the users’ perceived login speed for each
technique.
Figure 3.26: Easy to use: Results also indicates that 48% of participants believe that SemanticLock
was “easy to use”.
Error Recovery
There was a significant difference in error recovery based on technique (χ2(2) = 12.667, p
= 0.002). Significant differences were found between Pattern and SemanticLock as well as
PIN and SemanticLock. In both cases, Pattern and PIN were ranked favorably in regard
to ease of error recovery. There was no significant difference in how participants liked
interacting with the techniques (see Figure 3.28).
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Figure 3.27: Positive Feedback: Results also indicates that 57% had a positive opinion of Semanti-
cLock.
Figure 3.28: Error Recovery : Results also indicates that 43% observed easy error
recovery when using SemanticLock.
3.5 Discussion
Data analysis indicates that SemanticLock clearly has a stronger practical password strength
than the PATTERN or PIN authentication system. Results from section 3.4.1 show that Se-
manticLock has little or no password Start/End point bias (see Figure 3.15). Furthermore,
evaluations performed using partial guessing entropy shows that the practical entropy of
SemanticLock is closer to the security offered by a uniformly distributed Random 4-digit
PIN and outperformed all the practical strength of the PATTERN authentication system
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examined in this thesis (see Table 3.3).
3.5.1 Login Speed
Our participants performed significantly better using the SemanticLock. We believe the
two simple swipe movements to create the password gave our technique the advantage of
a faster login speed. The data from the quantitative and qualitative (see Figure 3.25)
analysis supports our observations. We initially expected that the Pattern authentication
system would be faster due to the participant‘s familiarity but this was not the case.
3.5.2 Error rates
Our participants experienced the lowest error rate when seated (see Figure 3.29) and
using their preferred Hand Input posture. Interestingly, we also discovered that during
the walking session PIN had the lowest error rate across all techniques (see Figure 3.22).
Participants ranked the techniques based on how easy it was to recover from errors in this
order: Pattern (9%), PIN (17%), and SemanticLock (43%). Meaning that SemanticLock
was far easier to recover from its errors. It would appear that the combination of short
continuous/discrete movements allow users to recover from errors better.
Figure 3.29: Error Rates: Error Rate based across all techniques by posture. Login
activities performed while seated had the lowest error rate across all techniques.
3.5.3 Memorability Test
Our participants displayed varying levels of difficulty in recalling their passwords. Our
analysis based on the data is shown in Figure 3.30. The memorability ratio of the Seman-
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Figure 3.30: Password Memorability: Results also indicate a steady increase in mem-
orability when using SemanticLock.
ticLock steadily increased every week. This is an indication that the Semantic-lock was
more memorable to the participants.
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored a novel and new screen lock concept based on semantic
constructs. We used novel aspects such as; set of graphical images as password tokens,
which are intended to enhance password memorability. The user is able to create a pass-
word using quick actions of dragging and re-positioning image tokens into their respective
positions via a combination of discrete and short continuous actions on the touchscreen.
The large number of possible semantic constructs derived from the (re)positioning of the
image tokens and the varieties of images to choose from give our method a theoretically
large password space and the current selection of images gives it a large practical password
space, and these images can be changed by users to make password tokens even more
customisable and memorable. We believe that SemanticLock‘s performances will improve
when users have more practice and familiarity with it. In regards to generalization, our
sample population represents the most common demography of mobile device users and
should be able to generalize to other populations. The results of a three-week mobile
device user study with participants using SemanticLock plus PIN and PATTERN show
that SemanticLock generally has superior performance compared to PATTERN and PIN
authentication techniques on key metrics such as login speed, memorability, user accep-
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tance, usability, and likeability. All in all, SemanticLock represents a simple, easy-to-use,
and usable authentication method for mobile devices and is a good alternative to other
common methods. We observed the below key lessons :
• Graphical authentication systems based on discrete and continuous movements out-
perform other authentication systems. The potential of SemanticLock to be faster
than the PATTERN is attributed to these dual movement properties.
• Authentication systems based on core graphical tokens with mnemonic properties
result in higher memorability values.
• Error recovery is strongly influenced by system design. We determined that graphical
user interactivity and user familiarity greatly reduces the error rates.
• The SemanticLock had the shortest pre-login delay time, which means that the par-
ticipants found it easier to recall their password faster than with other techniques,
therefore indicating better memorability factors.
• The type of device used by the participants (i.e. phone or tablet) had no effect on
their performance.
• SemanticLock performed excellently during the walking test. The results for both
walking encumbered and unencumbered provided a good indication of its potential
use under these scenarios.
Chapter 4
Exploring the Vulnerabilities and
Advantages of PATTERN
Authentication in VR
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we examined a new graphical authentication system that used
semantic constructs, that were derived from the repositioning icon tokens. After a 3 week
study and final analysis, our participants found SemanticLock more usable and secure than
the current mainstream PATTERN and PIN mobile device authentication system. In this
chapter, we explore a new mobile device environment, examining the performance and
interaction complexities of the PATTERN mobile device authentication system within the
virtual reality ecosystem. This enables us to examine the research gaps for our upcoming
experiments.
Virtual Reality (VR) has quickly gained a large user base as the technology becomes
cheaper, mainstream and more applications exist for this new environment. We observed its
usage in education [24], medical [46], shopping [117], advertisement [37] and manufacturing
[12] sectors. Some innovators and concept developers in the industry see VR as an evolution
of the popular mobile device market and rely on existing mobile device consumers in that
sector to promote and sustain the growth of this new trend [151, 102]. Global online
retailers and e-commerce platforms, such as Amazon and Alibaba have introduced virtual
59
60 ILESANMI AYODEJI OLADE
malls where VR enabled clients can walk through the shop and virtually interact with the
products on sale. Virtual reality is here to stay and as the application of virtual reality
continues to expand, the issue of user security and the lack of a standard authentication
becomes increasingly apparent [36]. We believe that VR and mobile devices, especially
smartphones and tablets are intrinsically linked in terms of usage, while other researchers
[151, 102] are exploring the development of new authentication technologies for the VR
environment such as biometrics [109, 62] and kinesiology [73, 111, 55]. We are looking at
porting an existing mobile device authentication system and observing how they perform in
this new environment and this has the advantage of pre-existing popularity and familiarity.
We are vividly aware of the security challenges plaguing the mobile device authentication
systems as large body of research [49, 60, 138, 1, 84, 7, 152] exist in that field and we wish
to explore the possible fallacies and advantages that a VR version of these authentications
may have; considering the fact that VR users are a large subset of existing mobile device
users. Our research focuses on examining the performance and usability factors of the
popular mobile device authentication system known as PATTERN lock within the VR
environment. This system was made popular by the Android smartphone market and it is
now practically the defacto authentication system on every mobile device.
The PATTERN authentication system is a grid-like display of nodes (see Figure 4.1)
whose password pattern is selected by continuous finger or pointer movement across the
screen to connect the password nodes. PATTERN has been plagued by numerous usage
and security issues [152, 134, 49, 140] in the mobile device usage ecosystem, and one of
the most prominent security weakness is Shoulder-surfing. We argue that the VR version
of PATTERN would be highly resistant to shoulder-surfing and will also perform compar-
atively well in other usage aspects such as speed, error-recovery, and high entropy.
4.2 Threat Model
Our threat model is designed to evaluate the possible vulnerabilities of our VR PATTERN
systems and it is based on previous studies. In our simulated attack, we define three
types of attackers. Type A attacker has no prior observation of the user and the attack is
based primarily on brute-force measures and social engineering [130, 6]. Type B attacker
is more effective; this attacker has observed the valid user on several occasions during
an authentication session or has access to video footage of the entire login session from
multiple strategic camera viewpoints. The Type C attacker is the most promising because
Chapter 4. Exploring the Vulnerabilities and Advantages of PATTERN Authentication
in VR 61
(a) SmartPhone PATTERN (b) VR PATTERN
Figure 4.1: Prominent mobile device authentication systems: The PATTERN authentication
system is popular with (a) mobile devices that have GUI touchscreen-based systems. (b) Shows the VR
PATTERN ported to the Virtual reality environment.
this attacker is also actually the valid user who has forgotten the actual password due to
long periods of not using the password. This attacker is allowed to watch previous video
footage of their own authentication process. This type of White-box penetration testing
allows our study to get a better perspective of the level of Shoulder-Surfing [148] resistance
our system possesses.
4.3 Methodology
We utilized three environments and two different sets of participants for data collection
during this study. A detailed discussion of our study follows.
4.3.1 Participant recruitment and ethical concerns
Because our study utilizes human subjects, it was reviewed and approved by our University
Research Ethics committee. One concern raised was whether or not participants would
inadvertently reveal their personal passwords. To prevent this, a text was added in the
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instructions of each experiment specifically warning participants not to use any current or
past personal password as part of their responses. Participants for all experiments were
volunteers, recruited via a university-wide e-mail. Participants were primarily students,
but also included some staff members. All participants were daily mobile device users.
Participants in the web survey portion of our study were not compensated, due to a large
number of participants and the relatively short duration of their participation. Volunteers
for the longer-term memorability and usability studies were compensated with coffee shop
gift cards worth between 5 and 30 US dollars, depending on the duration of participation.
4.3.2 Experimental Design
Our goal was to compare the performance metrics of the mobile phone version of the PAT-
TERN authentication system to those of the virtual reality version of the authentication
system. To do this, we followed a within-participants design. Below are the variables we
tracked:
The independent variables are
• Device Form-Factor
1. Mobile Device
2. Virtual Reality (VR)
• Interaction Methods
1. Mobile device : Touchscreen
2. VR Hand-Held-Controller (HHC)
3. VR Head-Mounted-Display (HMD)
4. VR LeapMotion
5. VR Eye-Tracking
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The dependent variables are
• Login Speed
• Pre-Login Delay Time
• Error Rate
• User usability and acceptance
• Shoulder-surfing resistance
Study Outline
We utilized three studies for data collection in an attempt to expose and collect the data we
need for our planned evaluation and comparison. The studies conducted were a web-based
study, a mobile study, and a virtual reality environment study.
Web Study: An Internet-based study, where a large number of participants were allowed
to create a series of PATTERN passwords via a web-based version of the PATTERN system
(see Figure 4.2a). The collected passwords were used for analysis (see Section 4.3.4).
Mobile Device Study: A mobile device study, using Android-based mobile phones (see
Figure 4.1a). Participants were tasked with creating and using the PATTERN password
over a period of time. Data collection and real-time participant survey was done via the
custom-built android PATTERN authentication system (see Section 4.3.5).
Virtual Reality Study: This study involved creating a virtual reality version of the
PATTERN authentication system (see Figure 4.1b). Participants interacted, using 4 dif-
ferent interaction methods, and created passwords while various metrics were tracked and
logged for analysis (see Section 4.3.5). We also made a video recording of these sessions
from 3 different points of view.
User Interaction Methods
Participants used five different methods to interact with the PATTERN authentication
system. The mobile device interaction is solely via the touch-screen, whereas the virtual
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(a) PATTERN Web Study Interface (b) 6 PATTERN Passwords
Figure 4.2: Web Study: The PATTERN Web Study presented a Web version of the PATTERN interface
(a) to participants who were asked to create random passwords. (b) From the numerous passwords, we
selected 6 passwords that were complex and uncommon.
reality environment PATTERN authentication system allowed us to use four VR interaction
methods as explained below :
Touch Screen: This is a property of mobile device screens that are able to respond to
touch. The participants use their fingers to touch and drag GUI objects around the mobile
device touchscreen, thus performing an interaction with the system.
Hand-Held-Controller (HHC): The HHC is a physical interactive device (see Figure
4.3a) held by the participant in a virtual reality environment. This device has a series of
buttons and also provides to the VR system important data such as the position, rotation,
and speed of the participant’s hand. Additionally, when represented in the VR environment
it can project a virtual laser beam of light to act as a pointer that the participants can use
to select and manipulate objects within the VR space.
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(a) VR Hand Controller (b) EyeTracking HMD
Figure 4.3: Prominent mobile device authentication systems: (a) Participants use the HHC to
interact with VR objects with six degree of freedom (6-DOF).
(b) Interior view of a HMD device fitted with Eye-tracking hardware .
Head-Mounted-Display (HMD): The HMD, is part of the VR headset unit (see
Figure 4.4a) and uses inertial motion sensors to estimate the participant‘s head position
and rotation in world-space, these sensors obtain data concerning the HMD and constantly
update the VR visual scene according to head movements. The HMD presents virtual
reality visuals to represent these changes and transitions of the participants‘ head. The
HMD allows us to extract the positional coordinates, rotational, acceleration and velocity
data of the participants during our experiment.
LeapMotion: LeapMotion [65] is a hand tracking infra-red based system (see Figure
4.4a), that tracks the hands of the user and feeds the data into the VR systems where a
digital representation of the hand (see Figure 4.4b) is rendered. The digital representation
can be used to interact with other objects within the Virtual reality environment.
Eye-Tracking: Eye-tracking hardware, called aGlass [3], was installed inside the HMD
to track the participants‘ gaze as they performed their task. We track the positional
coordinates (x,y) or direction where the participant is looking at within the virtual scene.
We determined based on the gaze period if the participant was initiating a selection and
drawing a PATTERN password. The eye tracker was calibrated with a 9-point accuracy
method (see Figure 4.3b).
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(a) LeapMotion sensor (b) Virtual Hands
Figure 4.4: VR LeapMotion Hand Tracking: (a) External view of HMD with a LeapMotion sensor
attached to the front (silver square sensor on front panel). (b) Digital representation of user‘s hands in VR
based on actual hands.
4.3.3 Apparatus
Study Software
In our study, we developed exact functional replicas of the PATTERN software (see Figure
4.1 and 4.2a) for each platform to be able to integrate data collection functions into the
software system process flow. We made great efforts to ensure the PATTERN software
was visually and functionally similar regardless of the implementation platform.
Web Interface Software: We implemented the PATTERN web-based interface (see
Figure 4.2a) using HTML5, CSS, PHP, and MySQL database back-end technologies. This
allowed us to implement graphical line drawing and icon high-light functions that are
common on touch-screen based devices. Data collected was saved in the database.
Mobile device Software: We created the mobile device system (see Figure 4.1a) with
Android Studio on a Windows 10 PC (Intel Core i7-6700, 128GB RAM, NVIDIA GeForce 1080).
Data collected on the mobile devices were stored as a text file on the device.
Virtual Reality Software: We created a VR environment (see Figure 4.1b), with
Unity3D and C# on a Windows 10 PC (Intel Core i7-6700, 128GB RAM, NVIDIA GeForce 1080)
to assist in the collection of our experimental data. Data collected was saved as a CVS on
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the PC running the VR environment.
Study Hardware
Touchscreen Mobile: Mobile devices are available in numerous dimensions. We
performed our study with a 5.2” LG Nexus 5X phone [67].
Virtual Reality Hardware: The Virtual Reality system we used for our study is the
HTC VIVE hardware [137] with standard handheld controllers (see Figure 4.3a). Third-
party add-on hardware such as aGlass [3] for Eye Tracking (see Figure 4.3b) and Leap-
Motion Hand tracking [65] (see Figure 4.4) were also used to provide additional tracking
information, thus creating a better realistically immersing VR experience.
4.3.4 Web-based Study
We presented the participants with a 3x3 PATTERN web-interface (see Figure 4.2a) and
requested that they create 10 unique passwords that have more than 3 nodes. Although
web-based experiments are harder to control than laboratory or supervised field studies,
this channel of data collection meets our requirements, offers numerous advantages and
allowed us to collect large amounts of data from our participants at various locations.
Each participant was tracked via their device Internet Protocol (IP) address and their
chosen PATTERN patterns were logged in a database.
Goals
Our primary goal was to quantify the effect of a participant’s choice on the security of pass-
words chosen. Every authentication scheme has entropy and the strength of such entropy
is determined by the probability distribution associated with the password space. Ideally,
this distribution is approximately uniform. We selected from the provided passwords, six
PATTERN patterns that we decided were well distributed across the password nodes (see
Figure 4.2b) to be used in the Mobile Device and Virtual Reality study.
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(a) VR:LeapMotion (b) VR:HHC (c) VR:HMD
Figure 4.5: Participants using various VR interaction techniques.
Participants
We created awareness about the Web study via social media and the university mailing list.
A tutorial video was made available on the website so participants could watch and learn
how to create PATTERN password patterns. We had no input in selecting the participants,
we did not collect any demographic information about these participants, but we ensured
their IP was unique.
4.3.5 Mobile Device and Virtual Reality (VR) Study
We developed a mobile device version (see Figure 4.1a) of the PATTERN interface that
was used during our web-based study (see Figure 4.2a). This mobile device authentication
system will be our baseline or control for this study due to the popularity and large body
of research literature [134, 7, 28, 22, 25, 49, 152] about its performance. It is important to
note that due to the peculiarity of this VR environment (see Figure 4.1b) we explored 4
different methods of user interactions (see Section 4.3.2). Each participant used 5 different
interaction techniques (see Section 4.3.2) and completed 3 PATTERN login trials per
interaction technique (see Figure 4.5). During the VR session, the participants’ physical
Login movements or actions were recorded with a video camera. We captured their actions
(see Figure 4.6) from 3 different points of view (Front, Top and Side). These recordings will
be used to analyze the level of resistance that virtual reality (VR) has against Shoulder-
surfing. Lastly, we provided a paper-based survey questionnaire to collect qualitative
feedback from our participants in a uniform and consistent way.
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Goals
Our objectives during the study, which involved participants, was to collect both qualitative
and quantitative data which would provide insight into our participant’s perception of
the likeability, usability, memorability and login speed of both types of the PATTERN
authentication system (see Figure 4.1 ). During the testing, a participant’s activities such
as touches, password tokens, strokes, pauses, timings, aborts, and errors were logged for
further analysis.
Participants
We recruited 15 participants from a local university and 51% of the participants were
between the ages of 17 to 27 and all our participants were right-handed. All were active
users of mobile phones and 60% had experience with Virtual Reality devices. 70% of them
used a phone with a fingerprint sensor, while 10% used the PIN, and 20% used PATTERN.
Task and Procedures
Our first step was to inform the participants about the confidentiality of their supplied
information and to explain the purpose of the project and the tasks they would need to
do. We required that everyone start with the mobile device environment, then conclude
with the virtual reality environment. We provided a five-minute training video to each
participant that depicts the usage of PATTERN in the mobile device and virtual reality
environment. We calibrated each participant‘s eyes for the aGlass EyeTracker software and
created a profile for each person and also explained the usage constraints of the LeapMotion
device, then we allowed participants to practice with the Virtual Reality equipment and
alerted them to the possibility of motion sickness while in the virtual reality environment.
Week 1 (First Phase): We allowed each participant to choose a PATTERN password
from our supplied list (See Figure 4.2). During the experiment, the participants are re-
quired to enter this selected password 3 times during the session. If the participant entered
the wrong password, the application alerted them to enter the correct password again. The
experiment finished with a Likert questionnaire that collected qualitative data about the
participants’ perceived usability, error-handling, security, and likeability. The average time
the participants used to complete the mobile device experiment was 2 minutes while the
VR experiments took about 14 minutes.
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Week 3 (Second Phase): In the second phase, i.e. 15 days after the first phase, we
explored the effects of shoulder-surfing within the VR environment. In this session we used
12 participants as “Attackers”, we selected 2 persons who were not involved previously with
the study as Type A and B attackers, and used 8 persons from week 1 (see section 4.3.5)
of our project who we confirmed were unable to remember their week 1 Login passwords
as Type C attackers. Type A attackers were not allowed to view the videos, while Type B
attackers as defined earlier in Section 4.2 of this thesis, viewed the videos and wrote down
3 possible passwords based on their visual evaluation of the participants’ actions. Type C
attackers viewed only their own videos. The outcome of this session is analyzed in Section
4.5.1.
4.4 Data Collection and Measurement
A description of the data that we collected and its relevance to the study.
4.4.1 Pre-Login Delay time
Pre-login delay is the elapsed time between when the participant indicated that they were
ready to start unlocking the device and the actual time they entered the password. This
data provides a view into evaluating the memorability and usability of the system. Studies
by Stobert et al. [127, 144] defined a direct relationship between memorability and pre-
login delay time. We analyze this data to quantify the level of memorability and usability
experienced by the participants.
4.4.2 Login Speed
The time period used to complete each trial of the login process for an interaction technique
was recorded. This measurement only recorded successful trials; failed trials were recorded
as singular failure events. Login speed was tracked from the moment a participant starts
password token entry until the entry was completed successfully.
4.4.3 Error Rate
The error rate was measured as a percentage of failed login attempts to the total number of
attempts required to complete the technique’s session. The number of failed login attempts
during a trial did not affect the number of trials that constituted a complete session.
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4.4.4 Shoulder-surfing Attack Evaluation
Shoulder-surfing is a known weakness of PATTERN on mobile devices [152, 148, 134, 22].
We setup three high-resolution cameras to record the physical actions of the participants.
These cameras captured the Front, Top and Side views of participants while ensuring that
their entire body was visible as they performed both the mobile device and VR sessions
(see Figure 4.6). The video feed was multiplexed into a single video allowing the ‘attackers’
to observe the participants simultaneously from all views.
Figure 4.6: Shoulder-surfing evaluation was performed by recording the participants‘ Login actions via 3
video cameras and having future ‘attackers’ view these recordings in an attempt to guess the passwords.
4.4.5 Subjective Data
We collected pre-test, in-test, and post-test surveys via an electronic questionnaire for the
mobile phone study, while the VR questionnaire was paper-based. The questions focused
on ease of use, perception of speed, the likelihood of adoption, error recovery, and interface
usability.
4.5 Results
We present the results of our study in both quantitative and qualitative formats. This
analysis is based on the raw numerical data and subjective data we collected from the
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participants.
4.5.1 Quantitative Results
Figure 4.7: Login Speed: Mean Login speed based on interaction techniques. The mobile device
Touchscreen has the lowest login time.
Login Speed
The Login speed data from the study indicates that MD:Touchscreen login speed was
faster than any of the other VR interaction technique login speed. The mean values of the
login speed of each interaction technique are shown in Figure 4.7. The one-way ANOVA
test (F(4,461) = 120.19, p < .031) indicates statistical differences between the interaction
techniques. A Tukey post hoc test revealed that MD:Touchscreen login speed (913.04 ±
172.53 ms, p < .001) was significantly faster than all VR interaction techniques, and there
was also statistically significant difference between the VR:HHC and the VR:Eye but there
was no statistically significant difference between the VR:HHC and VR:HMD interaction
techniques (960 ms, p = .965) or the VR:LeapMotion.
Pre-Login Delay Time
Our participants experience a time delay between when the trial started and when an
initial action or interaction was made. This pre-login delay time gives an indication of
familiarity or ease of use of these interaction techniques. Our analysis indicates that
the MD:Touchscreen has the lowest Pre-Login Delay time and the VR:Eye interaction
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technique has the highest time (see Figure 4.8). This is understandable since the virtual
reality environment was novel to most participants.
Figure 4.8: PreLogin Delay time: The PreLogin Delay Time is an indication of ease of use or
familiarity of the interaction techniques
Shoulder-surfing Attack results
Our 12 attackers consist of 2 Type-A attackers and 2 Type-B attackers. These 4 attackers
were allowed to watch the video recording of all the 15 participants sessions. While the 8
Type-C attackers who were former participants that forgot their passwords were allowed
to watch their previous login sessions. The 3 passwords could be of the 3-Node match, 4-
Node match or full match. We observed that 97% of the sessions used a 5-Node password.
The results indicate that the VR environment is highly resistant to shoulder-surfing with
the Type C attacker achieving a Full Match of 36% while Type B attacker and Type A
attackers have a 20% and 3% success rate respectively. We allowed the Type B and C
attackers to view the video recording of the mobile phone study sessions and the results
were 100% Full Match for all sessions, this supports the fact that mobile devices have little
or no resistance to well-implemented forms of shoulder-surfing. (see Figure 4.9).
Error Rates
Error rates classified by interaction techniques are an indication of the usability level of the
interaction techniques. As mentioned earlier, most participants are new to the VR environ-
ment, but we notice that the error rates of the VR:Eye and VR:HMD were very high. Some
system errors due to the VR:Eye hardware malfunctions were accounted and adjusted for.
A two-way ANOVA test was conducted to examine the error rate for each technique. There
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Figure 4.9: Shoulder-Surfing Attack: Results from the Shoulder-surfing attack process. We defined
the attackers and provided different knowledge and access to recorded videos, then allowed these attackers
to guess the PATTERN passwords that they observed.
was no significant effect of interaction by these independent variables on the error rate.
Furthermore, the analysis showed that the error rate was lowest for MD:Touchscreen and
there was a significant difference in the error rate of the MD:Touchscreen technique across
all interaction techniques (p = .001).
4.5.2 Qualitative Results
The results are based on a 5-point Likert scale questionnaire and subsequent user rankings
of the five interaction techniques. Each participant prior to the experiment answered a
pre-test survey which we used to obtain demographics, personal information, and mobile
device/VR usage experience. The Likert scaled questions were answered after the trial of
each technique to collect their subjective preferences. The data we collected was analyzed
using the Friedman test and we performed posthoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank test
with Bonferroni correction (p= 0.05/3 = 0.017) of those that are statistically significant. In
the questionnaire, we probed aspects of the users’ experience with the five login interaction
techniques.
Speed
Our participants’ experience with each interaction technique’s speed shows there was a
statistically significant perceived difference in speed depending on the technique (χ2(2)
= 18.321, p < 0.001) (see Figure 4.10). Post hoc analysis indicated that there were no
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significant differences between VR:HHC and VR:HMD trials (Z = -2.101, p = 0.036) or
between VR:HMD and VR:LeapMotion trials (Z = -1.560, p = 0.119). However, there was
a significant difference in speed between MD:Touchscreen and VR:HHC trials (Z = -3.573,
p < 0.001).
Figure 4.10: Perceived Login Speed: A comparison of the users’ perceived speed for each interaction
technique.
Likeability
Post hoc analysis indicated that there was no significant difference in how well participants
liked the techniques.
Usability
There was a significant difference in perceived ease of use of technique (χ2(2) = 14.22, p
= 0.001). Post hoc analysis indicated that there were no significant differences between
the MD:Touchscreen and VR:HHC (Z = -1.672, p = 0.94) or between the VR:HHC and
VR:LeapMotion (Z = -1.628, p = 0.103) (see Figure 4.11). However, there was a significant
increase in perceived ease of use between VR:HHC and VR:Eye (Z = -3.140, p = 0.002).
Error Recovery
There was a significant difference in error recovery based on the interaction technique
(χ2(2) = 12.667, p = 0.002). Significant differences were found between MD:Touchscreen
and VR:HMD as well as VR:LeapMotion and VR:Eye. In all cases, MD:Touchscreen and
VR:HHC were ranked favorably and there was no significant difference in their ease of
error recovery.
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Figure 4.11: Easy to use: Participants survey on which technique was easier to use. Report shows that
the mobile device touchscreen was easier to use.
4.6 Discussion
4.6.1 Login Speed
Our participants’ performed significantly better on the mobile device but this was closely
matched by their performance while using the VR:HHC and VR:LeapMotion. We believe
that the familiarity of prior usage of mobile devices played a strong part in this outcome
and surely with frequent usage of the VR interaction techniques their performances will
improve. The data from the quantitative and qualitative (see Figure 4.10) analysis supports
our observations.
4.6.2 Usability
Usability was determined by looking at the quantitative and qualitative data of this study.
Our evaluation of the quantitative login speed, error rates and the participant‘s survey
responses about error recovery, speed, likeability and ease of use indicates that the VR:HHC
and VR:LeapMotion was considered as usable as the mobile device MD:TouchScreen used
in this study (see Figure 4.12).
4.6.3 Shoulder-Surfing Resistance
The shoulder-surfing evaluation performed in section 4.5.1 indicates that PATTERN in
VR has a very high resistance to shoulder-surfing (see Figure 4.9). Thus, making this
solution highly secure for public usage where there might be multiple observers, we make
this assertion with high confidence because of the fidelity of our experimental design and
Chapter 4. Exploring the Vulnerabilities and Advantages of PATTERN Authentication
in VR 77
Figure 4.12: LIKERT Survey: Participants provided subjective feedback in a survey that was analyzed
to generate the above information.
we are certain that field observations of participants can rarely be as accurate as our
experiment.
4.7 Conclusion
We have presented a detailed and complete study to explore the outcome of porting the
popular PATTERN authentication system into the virtual reality environment. This study
shows that the PATTERN authentication system is well suited for VR. Participants per-
formed equally similar within the mobile device and virtual reality environment. Partic-
ipants performed better using VR interaction methods that were an extension of their
hands, results indicate that the metrics of the VR:HHC and VR:LeapMotion are always
similar to that of the mobile device. Virtual reality implementation of PATTERN is highly
resistant to shoulder-surfing, thus a clear advantage when considering the fact that mobile
device PATTERN has very little resistance to shoulder-surfing. We used the mobile device
version of PATTERN as a control and the reports of the study as stated above, indi-
cates that PATTERN in VR is moderately fast, functionally usable and highly resistant to
shoulder-surfing, and this will open doors to the implementation of a familiar and robust
PATTERN authentication systems into VR solutions.The novelty of this study was the
numerous interaction methods we made available to the participants during the study via
the virtual reality environment and teh fact that we were able to provide and enviroment
that eliminated the risk of shoulder-surfing.
Chapter 5
BioMove : Exploration of
Biometric identification from
human Kinesiological activities in
the Virtual Reality environment
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we reviewed the existing literature on Biometric authentication,
hoping to answer research questions and identify the research gaps. In this chapter, we
will explore Biometric authentication within the virtual reality environment with a special
focus on transparent kinesiologically based authentication.
The use of virtual reality (VR) in a variety of applications has increased significantly
in the last few years. The availability of inexpensive VR hardware together with rapid ad-
vances in their display and interaction peripherals have made VR popular. VR is currently
being used in numerous domains such as medical-care [46], education [24], advertisement
[37], shopping [117] and manufacturing [12]. High-end VR products are striving towards
being fully wireless, reduced size, and improved personalization. These new features will
open up a lot of usable possibilities and application domains. This new hardware also of-
fers new possibilities to authenticate or identify users, other than traditional ways to login,
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such as via PIN or other popular tethered methods. In this research, we provide the first
state-of-the-art approach to identifying users from a natural kinesiological aspect in VR
environments while including HMD integrated eye-tracking and gesture controllers. This
achieved an accuracy of 97.2%, which is significantly higher than other approaches that
authenticate users in real-world environments from sparse trajectories obtained using non-
invasive or body-mounted sensors. There will be a strong demand for a robust, transparent,
easy-to-use, and non-intrusive identification approach that allows these VR devices to be
securely used by multiple users without any perceived or actual inconvenience. Because, as
VR applications continue to grow, one aspect that has received little attention, to the best
of our knowledge, is privacy and security issues of VR systems. User interaction in a VR
environment is very different from other interactive systems, like mobile phones or com-
puters. Various well understood security threats and attacks work in a completely different
fashion within a VR environment, which makes well-known defense mechanisms ineffective
or inapplicable. For example, directly implementing PIN or PATTERN authentication in
VR environments, without any modifications, exposes the users to visual or observational
attacks to a much larger extent than non-VR environments because of the relatively large
movements of interactions in VR, and because most VR devices obscure the user’s view,
limiting their awareness of the external environment. These types of identification mecha-
nisms will not only be impractical for VR systems but also does not leverage their unique
and inherent features and hardware capabilities.
Our research focuses on the level of security needed to positively confirm the identity of
a user using various known attributes that are distinct from other users engaged in a VR
environment. In VR systems, users’ body motion is captured to provide an immersive ex-
perience where their actions can be mimicked by avatar representations in real-time. This
mimicry can range from the movements of their head, hand, leg, and other parts, including
eyes, when a eye tracker is present in the VR device. VR systems present these movements
that are as kinesiologically closed as possible to the users’ movements [110, 74, 142]. Kine-
siology is the study of the mechanics of body movements. A large body of literature exists
on Kinesiology [73, 111, 55], and its results have been used by various disciplines including
health, criminology, sports, rehabilitation and identification of people. Kinesiology defines
and identifies co-joined movement behavioural patterns by the user’s head and other limbs
as an indication of specific movements in progress or about to start. For example, a user
reaching to the ground to pick up an item must have the knees or back bent while the
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head may face the particular direction according to the intended action. We argue that
the kinesiological behavioural patterns exhibited by a user while interacting with a VR
system to perform activities contain unique identifying cues that provide some measure of
biometric confidence about the person using the VR environment. If these cues are reli-
ably captured, using inertial and orientational sensors that now come in the VR devices,
the user’s movements can be recorded and used to create a biometric profile, which could
then be used to provide an extra layer of security for the sensitive processes carried out
in the VR space. It is possible to envision a transparent, easy-to-use, and non-intrusive
identification method that may be used independently or as a second factor with a pre-
existing VR identification system. We believe other studies, such as [151, 102], that are
exploring the migration of standard mobile device identification systems such as PIN and
PATTERN into virtual reality environments will benefit from an additional non-intrusive
identification system.
In this thesis, we present BioMove, a behavioural pattern identification system that
explores our above stated hypothesis. In particular, we investigate whether the head, limb,
torso and eye movement patterns displayed by the user in the virtual reality space could
be used as a biometric authenticating factor. To test the above hypothesis, we performed
the following three activities.
1. Kinesiologically designed VR environment. We implemented a carefully de-
signed VR environment to ensure the observation and recording of kinesiologically
based movement patterns. We derived a set of typical tasks for an experiment that
emphasize various movements of the head, eyes, arms, wrist, torso and legs [11] (see
Figure 5.1).
2. Focused tasks for data collection. The participants are engaged in the task of
placing the red balls into the cylindrical containers (see Figure 5.1) and the green/blue
cubes into the rectangular enclosure. These task can be broken down primitively into
elliptical movements on the XY-axis and rotational movements on the XZ-axis. We
tracked and recorded various data from the head-mounted-display (HMD) VR de-
vice, an eye gaze tracker (GAZE) and the hand-held-controller (HHC) as the users
interacted and moved items within the VR environment (see section 5.5.2 and 5.5.6).
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Figure 5.1: A screenshot of task based VR environment. The environment was designed to
elicit task based movements of users that allowed for biometric identification. Participants would perform
movements that were primitively elliptical. In the above example, the user needed to relocate the ball from
the bin to the container.
3. VR Identity model. The data derived from the task sessions was passed to a
k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN) classifier to build an identity model, which was then
used to identify the user during a future activity based on a preset threshold level of
confidence (see Section 5.5.7).
5.2 Threat Model
In an attempt to improve the usability of sensitive VR applications or processes within
them, we have identified three types of possible attackers. The Type-I attacker has no prior
knowledge of the expected VR activities required and is mainly using a form of brute force
attack. The Type-II attacker knows the required activity expected for identification (e.g.
through watching a video clip or other observation methods), but has no other knowledge of
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Figure 5.2: A diagram of the BioMove biometric identification process. As the user performs
activities within the virtual reality environment, the motion data stream is passed to the Identification
Model which determines the task and the user performing the task. A confidence value from the model is
used to determine if the user is an authorized. If the user is not an authorized user, the VR session, for
example, can be stopped.
the user’s features that serve to identify them. The Type-III attacker is the most dangerous
attacker because the identification activity is known and this attacker has similar physical
features as the valid user. Our real-time continuous identification system negates the possi-
bility of malicious or opportunistic attacks when the authorized user is temporarily absent
or distracted, thereby denying an attacker access to the VR environment. In our threat
model, the valid user of the VR system steps away, and the attacker (Type-II or Type-III )
who has previously observed or has prior knowledge of the VR systems starts to use the
system. After a series of uncharacteristic head and body movements while interacting with
the VR environment, our method will lock the device or prompt the attacker to prove their
identity via an alternative identification method. Figure 5.2 gives a highly abstracted view
of how such an identification system might be designed. A numeric value known as con-
fidence value determines if the activity belongs to a valid user. The confidence threshold
value and the number and nature of uncharacteristic movements triggering the secondary
identification mechanism would in practice be tuned to strike a balance between usability
and security. In section 5.6, we performed a Whitebox penetration test using Type-II or
Type-III attackers to determine the appropriate threshold confidence value. We make ref-
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erence below to some examples of VR environments which might benefit from our methods.
Virtual Reality Gaming Applications. Numerous VR games are now becoming
more multi-player oriented [109, 62]. A large number of these games require the user to
perform different types of physically based interactions; as such, an identification method
like BioMove would be very useful in these cases.
Virtual Reality based Shopping Applications. A growing number of online re-
tailer and e-commerce platforms have started introducing virtual stores, allowing customers
to transverse through virtual shops, pick and examine virtual 3D replicas of their product
inventories [37, 12]. These companies, such as Alibaba and Amazon would benefit, from a
transparent identification system that continuously verifies in the background its current
user based on the motion patterns they exhibit during their shopping sessions.
5.3 Virtual reality task driven biometric identification
A study by Kupin et al. [62] was similar to our work, but in this study their 14 subjects
picked up and threw balls at a target within the VR environment using the HTC VIVE
hand-held controller. They achieved an accuracy of 92.86% using a simple distance metric,
which is much lower than the 97.2% accuracy we achieve with our method. Another inter-
estingly similar study by Pfeuffer et al. [109], which included HMD integrated eye-tracking
and involved numerous activities such as pointing, grabbing, walking, and typing within
the VR environment in an attempt to capture biometric discriminants for identification.
This study was focused on the quality of the discrimnants, and reported accuracies of at
best 63%.
5.4 Contribution of our work
The above study has some similarities to our work because they evaluated head or body
movements within the VR space as a form of biometric discriminants. However, there are
also significant differences that sets our work apart.
• Biometric data sources. Mustafa et al. [87], Li textitet al. [69], Sluganovic et al.,
and Yi et al.. [149] solely relied on head movements to gather the unique significant
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biometric features. This singular data input source increases the probability of ma-
licious attacks. Our solution extracted biometric data from users’ head, eyes, and
hands in a kinesiologically conformative manner.
• Applicable to VR environments that are based on active body movements.
Mustafa et al. [87] has pointed out that their solution focuses on a particular VR
environment, whereas our solution can be used to authenticate in any VR environ-
ment where kinesiologically active movements exist or are used. Additionally, we
track head and eye movements, which are basic actions exhibited while using a VR
system.
• Continuous vs one-time identification. The solutions proposed by Li et al. [69]
and Yi et al. [149] use a one-time identification model, allowing for a larger window
of attack. Our study uses a continuous and dynamic identification model.
• Identification domain. The solutions in Li et al. [69] and Yi et al. [149] require the
identification to occur in the physical domainvia smart glasses and wearable devices,
whereas our solution uses the virtual domain, such as any applicable VR experience
for identification, making our application more scalable and adaptable.
• Multiple tasks. The study by Kupin et al. [62] based their identification on a
singular task of throwing the ball at a target, whereas our study involved 6 different
VR tasks that includes a variety of kinesiological movements.
• Penetration or vulnerability testing. Mustafa et al. [87], Kupin et al. [62]
and Pfeuffer et al. [109] did not provide penetration testing of their solution. We
conducted a Type-II and Type-III whitebox penetration testing (see Section 5.9) and
our results indicated high resistance to these attacks (see Figure 5.9).
5.5 Materials and Methods
5.5.1 Goals
In this study, our objective is to create a VR environment that allows users to perform
a set of tasks. Our experiment comprises 6 different tasks, and each task is composed
of a variable number of generic movements. We base these tasks on our review of the
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literature on kinesiology and VR applications, thus they represent elliptical curves in three-
dimensional space involving coordinated motions of the head, eyes, and hands. Using these
tasks, we conducted a within-subjects study with 10 sessions per participant per day over
a 2-day period. A session took an average of 2 minutes. Our experiment provided the
data that we needed to investigate and understand whether biometric discriminants can
be extracted from motion data recorded from multiple sensors. Another expectation we
had was for our resultant system to be able to easily identify its users and specific tasks.
5.5.2 Experimental Design
The participant movements are grouped into a set of tasks, which represent the raw data
of our study, which will help derive the features required in our analysis. The components
of the movement and the resultant tasks are explained below.
User Tasks
The movements were encapsulated into a task. We designed two variants of this task, one
dealt with balls and the other with cubes. The participants were given the task of grabbing,
transporting and dropping balls and cubes into containers strategically placed within the
VR environment (see Figure 5.1). This ensures that kinesiologically valid motion data
would be captured during our experiments. We would then pass the collected data into
a kNN classifier and train an identification model with a high confidence value output.
Below are the variables we are tracking:
The raw data sources
• Task 1: Interacting with Balls in VR environment.
• Task 2: Interacting with Cubes in VR environment.
• Participant static metrics such as height, arm length, and waist height.
The features tracked
• Head-Mounted Display positional, rotational data.
• Eye tracking gaze positional data.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Possible 6-DOF VR Movements. (a) [Positional] Motion is the location of the object
in the 3D world space. There are 3 possible positions motions (3-DOF). (i) Elevation: is where the
head/hand moves up or down (i.e. when bending down or standing up) (ii) Strafe: is where the head/hand
moves left or right (i.e. sidestepping). (iii) Surge: is where the head/hand moves forwards or backwards
(i.e. when walking). (b) [Rotational Motion] is the orientation of the object in 3D world space. There
are 3 possible orients (3-DOF). (i) Roll: is where the head/hand pivots side to side (i.e. peeking around a
corner). (ii) Pitch: is where the head/hand tilts along a vertical axis (i.e. when looking up or down). (iii)
Yaw: is where the head/hand swivels along a horizontal axis (i.e. looking left or right).
• Hand-Held Controller positional and rotational data.
Movements
Each movement involves three main aspects of the body to varying degrees. These aspects
are:
• Head Movements. The head moves through the six degree of freedom (6-DOF)
while the participant targets, rotates and translates within the VR environment (see
Figure 5.3). This is captured via the sensors in the HMD.
• Eye Movements. The eyes move as the participant locates, targets, grabs and
moves the objects within the VR environment. This is captured using an eye tracking
system embedded in the HMD (Figure 4.3b).
• Hand Movements. The hand moves through the 6-DOF while the participant
grabs, transports, rotates, targets and drops the objects of interest (see Figure 5.3).
This is captured via the head-held controller (HHC) (see Figure 4.3a).
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5.5.3 Research Ethics
All subjects gave their informed consent for inclusion before they participated in the study.
The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The protocol was
reviewed by the XJTLU Research Ethics Committee and found to be low risk research.
5.5.4 Apparatus
The Virtual Reality Environment
We created a VR environment, with Unity3D and C# on a Windows 10 PC (Intel Core i7-
6700, 128GB RAM, NVIDIA GeForce 1080) to assist in the collection of our experimental data.
In our VR environment, positioned in front of the participant is a wooden stand with
three horizontal poles that are vertically spaced dynamically to be reachable based on the
participant’s height (see Figure 5.4). Furthermore, at the opposite end of each horizontal
pole is a cylindrical container and a cubic container that will be the final destination of the
objects that the participants interact with during the session. Lastly, on the left side of
the participant is a stack of cubes and to the right side of the user is a stack of balls. The
VR environment mimics the real-world and objects follow the laws of physics and their
composite materials. The participant is allowed to move around within the environment.
Figure 5.4: VR environment layout: The environment consist of a wooden stand, balls and cubes
that participant relocate into the respective containers.
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The Interaction Devices
The feeling of immersivness of VR is due to the ability to interact realistically with objects
within the environment. For this experiment we used the HTC Vive VR system. Our
participants would interact using the following:
• Head. The VR headset containing the HMD has inertial motion sensors to esti-
mate the participant’s head position and rotation. These sensors can capture data
concerning the HMD and constantly update the VR environment according to head
movements. The HMD allows us to extract the positional coordinate and rotational,
acceleration and velocity data for our experiment (see Figure 5.3).
• Eyes. The eye-tracking hardware, called aGlass [3], was installed inside the HMD
to track the participants’ gaze as they performed the tasks. It can track the the
positional coordinates (x,y) or direction where the participant is looking at within
the virtual scene. The eye tracker was calibrated with a 9-point accuracy method.
• Hands. The hand-held controller (HHC) allows participants to replicate their hand
motion and usage within the VR scene to grab, move and release VR objects. The
HHC also provides the positional coordinates, rotational, acceleration and velocity
data during the experiment.
5.5.5 Participants
We enlisted 25 participants from a local university. Our pre-testing survey reveals that
72% of the participants were between the ages of 18 to 29 and only 3 participants were
left-handed. All were aware of VR technologies, but only 64% of them had previously used
a VR application. All participated voluntarily without any financial remuneration.
5.5.6 Task and Procedures
Each session started with a brief introduction to the experiment. Then the participants
were shown a 2 minute tutorial video that demonstrated the intended activity and how
the VR devices were used, after which they were allowed to practice each task a couple
of times. The physical measurement to capture the user height, arm span, waistline and
knee height was done using the hand-held controllers as a measuring tool (see Figure
5.5). These measurements were used to configure the VR environment to ensure that all
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participants have similar experiences within the VR environment. For example, the VR
objects are adjusted to the participants physical attributes so all items can be reachable.
Additionally, eye tracking 9-point calibration was done once and the configuration data
was stored with the participant ID for future use. A session took approximately 2 minutes,
during which the participants would grab, relocate, drop 3 balls and 3 cubes into their
respective containers (See Figure 5.1). Each participant was allowed to rest for 2 minutes
after the completion of 5 out of 10 sessions.
(a) User Arm Span (b) User Reach (c) User Waist height (d) User Knee height
Figure 5.5: Pre-Experiment measurements: The Participants’ body metrics were taken before the
initial experiment session commenced. The data was used to configure the VR environment to ensure that
all participants would have similar experiences in the environment.
5.5.7 Data and Feature Processing
We collected 5 features from the raw data consistently as the participants performed the
tasks in the VR environment. We logged the data at the rate of 25 readings per second
(25Hz), combining the data stream from the HHC, HMD, and eye tracker to create a
movement data vector with supporting metadata. This component movement data vector
or movement vector is shown below:
• HHC and HMD:
– Positional Data: x, y, z.
– Rotational Data: x, y, z, w. (Quaternion format)
• Eye Tracking Device:
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– Positional Data: x, y.
• Miscellaneous Metadata:
– Task performed: t, (where 1 ≤ t ≤ 6). (We have 6 different tasks that are performed
in a Session)
– Time Stamp : yyyy-mm-dd-hh-M-ss-zzz.
Motion Data ReSampling
In the experiment, each participant performed numerous sessions in the VR environment
and their session completion interval varied. Consequently, we needed to resample the data
to create a consistent set of data for all participants. Each participant performed the task
at different speeds while each task was defined by a sequence of movement vectors which
were captured at 25 movement vectors per second (25Hz). For example, if participant A
and B completed Task 1 in 50 seconds and 100 seconds respectively, participant B would
have 2500 movement vector readings, while participant A has 1250 readings for the same
identical task. Our resample process allowed us to select 1250 movement vector readings
from participant B’s data, ensuring that all participants would have the same number of
movement vector readings. Below are some definitions:
• Session: A Session S is a set of task t (see Equation 5.1).
S = {t1, ..., t6} where cardinality |S| = 6 (5.1)
• Task: A Task T is a set of movement vectors m (see Equation 5.2).
T = {m1, ...,mn} where cardinality |T | = n (5.2)
• Median: The median D of the cardinality of movement vectors |T | for each type of
tasks {t1, ..., t6} across all sessions S in the experiment are determined as follows :
For Each Task type Tx (where 1 ≤ x ≤ 6) in the Experiment
Dx = Median(|Tx|1, ..., |Tx|n) (5.3)
where |Tx| is the cardinality of a set of movements of task type x
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• Resampling Process: The Median or sample size Dx has been determined for
each Task type Tx (see Equation 5.3). The Task movement count |T | is resampled
to the relevant Dx movement count. Therefore, at the end of the resampling process
each task group would have the same number of movements vectors, which in this
case is the median value D, across all participants, and any task that does not meet
the above resampling process criteria is discarded as outliers. The resampling process
resulted in 65,241 valid movement vectors (see Section 5.5.7 and Algorithm 1).
As stated earlier, we collected data from 25 participants initially. We later had to re-
move the data of 4 participants due to invalid eye-tracking data, cause by a hardware issue,
we also removed the data of 3 and 4 other participants due to inconsistent data from the
HHC and HMD devices respectively. The remaining 14 participants’ data was resampled
according to the steps in Section 5.5.7 . This process left us with 10 participants whose
6 task sessions met the resampling requirements.
5.5.8 Machine Learning Classification Framework
The experiment produced a total of 65,241 movement vectors after the resampling process
and removal of outliers. We divided the data into 80% for training and the remaining
20% was reserved as testing. The classification was performed using the MatLab platform,
and to gain insights into how different classifications methods might affect performance we
employed the built-in MatLab Classification Learner App, which automatically performed
supervised machine learning tasks such as interactively exploring data, selecting features,
training models and assessing results. Models tested included decision trees, discriminant
analysis, support vector machines, logistic regression, k-nearest neighbors (kNN), naive
Bayes, and ensemble classification. We also enabled the PCA (principal component anal-
ysis) feature to reduce the data dimensionality using PCA on the predictor data and then
transform the data before training the models. We selected the k-Nearest Neighbour (kNN)
classifier because KNN is a non-parametric, lazy learning algorithm and best suited for our
movement vector datasets in which the data points are separated into several classes to
predict the classification of a new sample point. KNN is also very sensitive to outliers and
bad features. We strongly believe the high-level of accuracy observed is due to our resam-
pling process (see Section 5.5.7). Additionally, KNN is less computationally intensive and
will work optimally on all types of low powered mobile devices.
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Algorithm 1: Movement vector Resample algorithm
Input : Arrays of Task objects and precalulated Median of movement vectors for each Task type
Output: Array of Task objects with movement vectors resampled to match corresponding task type
median
1 Function ReSampleTask(TaskObj[ ] t, TaskTypeMedian[ ] d)
2 TaskObj[ ] DownSampleTaskObj = [ ];
3 for taskType← 1 to 6 do
4 // get all the Task objects of a TaskType.
5 TaskObj[ ] tmpT = t.getSubset(taskType);
6 // get the movement vector Median value for that TaskType.
7 medianV alue = d[taskType];
8 foreach task in tmpT do
9 taskMovementCount = task.movement.count();
10 if taskMovementCount >= medianV alue then
11 // round down the value.
12 stepvalue = round(taskMovementCount/medianV alue);
13 movementPos = 0;
14 MovementVector tmpMovement;
15 // ReSample the movement vectors
16 while movementPos < taskMovementCount do
17 tmpMovement.add(task.movement[movementPos]);
18 movementPos = movementPos+ stepvalue;
19 end while
20 // copy the resampled movemeent vector back into the task
object
21 task.movement = tmpMovement;
22 DownSampleTaskObj.add(task);
23 end if
24 end foreach
25 end for
26 return DownSampleTaskObj;
27 end
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Finally, after cross-validating each model type, the MatLab Data Browser displayed
each model and its k-fold, cross-validated classification accuracy, and highlighted the kNN
model as having the best accuracy of 97.2% among other classifiers. The goal of cross-
validation is to test the model’s ability to predict new data that was not used in estimating
it. With this goal in mind, one wants to estimate how accurately a predictive model will
perform in practice, therefore a model is given a dataset of known data on which training
is run (training dataset), and a dataset of unknown data against which the model is tested.
The output is the predictive accuracy of the model.
Figure 5.6: Participant Identification Process flow: As the participant performs the task or motion
within the VR environment, the actions are broken into identifiable task by the Task Identification model.
The output is then sent to the appropriate task focused participant identification model. The output of
the identification process is then fed into an aggregator that attaches a confidence value and predictively
confirms the valid participant
Identification
For our identification scenario, we had to train on two different sets of predictors that re-
sulted in models with different identification functions. We obtained two training models.
The first model (the Task Identification model) focused on identifying the type of tasks
(t1, ..., t6) performed and the second model (the Participant Identification model) focused
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on determining the participants (P1, ..., Pn) performing the tasks (see Figure 5.6). As the
participants performed the task or motions within the VR environment, their physical ac-
tions or movements were broken or sampled into identifiable tasks by the task identification
model. The output was then sent to the appropriate task focused participant identification
model. The output of the identification process was then fed into an aggregator that would
attach an accuracy value and predictively confirm the identity of each participant.
• Task Identification Model. This model is trained on identifying the task per-
formed by the participants based of the movement vector streams. The resulting
model makes a prediction of the task ti from the set of all possible tasks T . This
stage allows a practical implementation where the results of this stage are used to
select the correct participant identification model, thereby increasing accuracy and
response time.
• Participant Identification Model. This model is trained to identify participants
performing a particular task. The resulting model makes a prediction of the partici-
pant pi from the set of all participants P . In this scenario we have n = 6 tasks thus
resulting in 6 different participant identification models. We argue that task specific
model results in higher accuracy and faster identification systems (see Figure 5.6).
• Participant Identification Aggregator. The Aggregator module receives the
output of the participant identification model and uses the data to produce a weighted
average and frequency analysis across the tasks. The output of this aggregator mod-
ule is the participant ID and the prediction accuracy score of the participant with
the highest prediction value across the 6 tasks (see Figure 5.6).
5.6 Whitebox Penetration Testing
Penetration testing evaluates the security of a system against malicious attacks to identify
vulnerabilities, and this requires us to use Whitebox techniques. During the study, three
high resolution video cameras were placed at the TOP, LEFT and FRONT locations of the
participant to record the external physical actions of our participants (see Figure 5.7). We
selected the participant P6 because this participant had the highest prediction accuracy of
100% and participant P3 with the lowest prediction accuracy of 85% (see Figure 5.8).
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.7: Task Sessions: (a) Participant performing a task while being recorded by 3 cameras placed
at TOP, LEFT, FRONT locations. As shown in the picture the actions performed by the participant are
monitored and recorded (see TV screen) with emphasis placed on the head and hand movements. This
recording is later viewed by an attacker in an attempt to emulate the participant’s movement. (b) A
participant stretches to maximum height as she performs the task. These kinesiological movements are
captured and processed for unique biometric discriminants
Two groups of 6 attackers (3 females, 3 males) were selected. The first group consist
of users who were similar in height, arm span and weight (CloneMale CM or CloneFe-
male CF) to the valid participant. The second group consist of randomly selected users
(RandomMale RM or RandomFemale RF). Each attacker performed 5 sessions each of
Task 1 to Task 6 after watching videos of two the valid participants (P3, P6) performing
these tasks. We passed the captured attacker movement task data into the kNN model
trained for P3 and P6 and tracked the results based on the level of confidence values (see
Figure 5.9). As shown in Figure 5.9, the attackers did not attain the minimum confidence
value required to qualify as a valid user. We also observed that the attackers with similar
physical features as the valid users had higher confidence levels, these levels are even higher
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Figure 5.8: Accuracy per participant across all tasks: The prediction accuracy of participants
movements across all tasks.
when attackers and valid users are of a similar gender.
Figure 5.9: WhiteBox Penetration Test: Attackers mimicking the tasks performed by the valid
participants P3 and P6 in an attempt to breach the security of the BioMove identification system. Results
indicate different level of confidence values shown above. Attackers with similar physical features to the
valid users have higher confidence values.
5.7 Results and Discussion
We achieved highly accurate results in identifying participants within the VR environment.
The identification process involves first identifying the task and then identifying the partic-
ipant. On the Windows 10 PC (Intel Core i7-6700, 128GB RAM, NVIDIA GeForce 1080), we clocked
the GPU down to 1600 MHz and observed an average identification processing speed of
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35 milliseconds per 1000 identification evaluations. At this speed, the response is instan-
taneous from the users perspective. Overall, we achieved a cross-validated classification
accuracy of 97.2% and an error rate of less than 3% using the testing data and additional
study data on the trained identification model. We generated a confusion matrix that
summarizes the actual performance of the kNN algorithm, thus providing us with a view
into what the model handled correctly and what types of errors it was making (see Figure
5.10). Furthermore, results from the movement data identification of all participants across
all tasks is shown in Figure 5.8. Our whitebox penetration test indicates that attackers
impersonating the valid participants resulted in less than 50% accuracy value, thus a ac-
curacy value threshold above 80% will be sufficient to protect against malicious attacks
producing false positive identifications. The penetration test also confirms that attackers
who are physically similar to the valid participant produce higher accuracy values (see
Figure 5.9).
Figure 5.10: kNN Classifier Confusion Matrix: A confusion matrix summarizes the performance of
a classification algorithm.It gives a better idea of what your classification model is getting right and what
types of errors it is making. Classification accuracy alone can be misleading because we have more than
two classes in our dataset.
The potential application of this research is a form of universal identification module
that is hosted by the VR device firmware system and independent of any specific VR soft-
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ware application, be it a game or productivity tool. This solution may be implemented
using the low-level Open Broadcaster Software (OBS) OpenVR [104] application program-
ming interface (API) kit or the new OSVR [106] input plugin that mirrors all movement
data at the hardware level and dynamically hooks into base GUI modules of all high-level
VR applications to interrupt their session if the transparent non-intrusive identification
(TNI) based on these movement data fails (see Figure 5.2). This proposed universal iden-
tification module can also be configured to trigger the local identification process on the
high-level VR session it interrupted as a means of providing a second-factor identification
and allowing the system to request the user to provide an alternative identification. Our
research was aimed at users between the ages of 18 to 30, which is the largest demography
of user groups of VR systems [77]. Although, looking at the aging process and how that
affects the use of the VR identification system is interesting and important to explore, so
that we can have more targeted systems for each specific group; it is outside of the scope
of the thesis, and therefore a part of our future work.
5.8 Conclusion
Our study provides a preview into what can be achievable in terms of using kinesiological
movements within virtual Reality (VR) environments for biometric identification. The
novelty of this study emanates from our process of using machine learning and task de-
rived kinesiology in the virtual reality environment to biometrically identify the users.
We evaluated 65,241 dataset of head, eyes and hand movements using machine learning
to create a continuous biometric identification system. In our best configuration, we at-
tained a classification accuracy of 97.2%. These results indicate that the head and body
movement based biometric identification holds promise that points to the possibility for
continuously identifying and authenticating participants in VR systems. In practice our
method would not have to be VR application specific since we have distilled the primitive
body movement patterns that are similar across different VR environments. For example,
a movement biometric template captured in the core VR systems can be used to authenti-
cate in a VR gaming application or banking application. We also determined that attacks
on our BioMove identification system would require a highly sophisticated attacker. We
argue that simultaneously providing the system false-positive data vectors such as eye,
head and hand movement vectors that are kinesiologically replicating a valid participant
is extremely difficult. In the future, we plan to extend our research to different groups
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and evaluate the relative accuracy and robustness of our approach across multiple groups,
especially taking into account the effect of aging on the kinesiological movements of users.
In addition, future work will explore integrating our solution into pre-existing VR environ-
ment frameworks when VR hardware manufacturers provide APIs that allow us to embed
our systems into their firmware. As a result, we will have a real-time application that
will be totally responsive and transparent to users while interacting with a VR device do-
ing typical tasks such playing a game, doing learning activities, and exploring multi-user
worlds. We believe that our research can serve as a second-factor authentication system
where the verification will be 1-to-1.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we introduce Usable Secure Interfaces for Mobile Devices, and our main
objective was to examine the attributes of our established hypotheses. We achieved this
through the evaluation of existing literature, extensive prototype developments, and em-
pirical experiments. The results and knowledge from previous experiments were used as a
foundation for further evaluation as we evolved our research through various user environ-
ments such as from mobile phone devices into virtual reality devices while ensuring that
the evaluated systems remain the same or similarly represented in the new environment to
maintain consistency of operations and ecological viability to our participants.
Our research produced two novel solutions and a novel virtual reality evaluation of
pre-existing authentications systems. Firstly, the SemanticLock graphical authentication
system, as explained in Chapter 3, defined a state-of-the-art method of usable security for
mobile devices using memory enchanced semantic methods for password creation. Secondly,
the porting of the popular PATTERN authentication system, as explained in Chapter 4,
into the virtual reality environment to allow a multitude of interaction methods to be tested
on the authentication system. Thirdly, the BioMove authentication system, as explained in
Chapter 5, used the unique aspect of human kinesiology and machine learning to positively
predict the identity of users performing task within the virtual reality environment.
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6.1 Contributions
Specifically, our contributions to the research questions of this thesis are listed in details
as follows:
1. Re-conceptualizing mobile device interfaces to make them both secure and
usable: We designed and developed SemanticLock to explore a graphical authenti-
cation system that was as usable as other conventional methods while offering better
memorability and security. These features were achieved by combining a semantically
meaningful story-based password to improve memorability with a carefully designed
password space to improve user-selected password entropy. Our memorability study
showed that users retained SemanticLock passwords much more easily than PIN or
PATTERN, even after two weeks of non-use. In the final analysis, our participants
both quantitatively and qualitatively found SemanticLock more usable and secure
than current mainstream authentication methods.
2. The acceptable levels of complexity an interface could have to be secure
and yet still usable: We developed and presented a detailed and complete study to
explore the outcome of porting the popular PATTERN authentication system into the
virtual reality environment. Using observations from existing literature, we carefully
recreated the virtual reality (VR) version of PATTERN to function as closely as
possible to the mobile device version. Our study used the mobile device version of
PATTERN as a control and the reports of the study indicate that PATTERN in VR
is moderately fast, functionally usable and highly resistant to shoulder-surfing, and
this will ease the implementation of a familiar and robust PATTERN authentication
systems into VR solutions.
3. The technological impediments that make it diffcult to develop secure in-
terfaces: Our study provides a glimpse into what can be achievable in terms of using
kinesiological movements within the VR environment for biometric authentication.
We evaluated datasets of head, eyes and hand movements and used machine learn-
ing processes that resulted in models with high classification accuracy allowing for a
continuous biometric authentication system. Our results indicate that the head and
body movement-based biometric authentication holds the promise that points to the
possibility of continuously identifying and authenticating participants in VR systems.
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it is noteworthy that in practice our method would not have to be VR application-
specific since we have distilled the primitive body movement patterns that are similar
across different VR environments. We also determined that attacks on our BioMove
authentication system would require a highly sophisticated attacker. We are able to
obtain a trained model classification or identification accuracy of 97.2%.
6.2 Future Work
In this thesis, we have presented works that demonstrate novel tremendous practical po-
tential in real-world applications of mobile security. In this section, we describe several
specific future projects that could be achieved.
6.2.1 SemanticLock Authentication
Building on the results of our 3 weeks study, we hope to implement a larger public based
study that will involve millions of users across the world in a real-world environment. The
SemanticLock will be rewritten as an integrated replacement Login service and made avail-
able on all mobile device platforms then released for download. Other improvements suchs
as user defined icons will be possible. The usage data received from these public partici-
pants will provide better insights and spotlight areas for further improvement. We hope
in the long run the SemanticLock will be a popular viable alternative for authentication
on mobile devices in the public software domain.
6.2.2 PATTERN Authentication in VR
Although our study outcomes were satisfactory, we recognize that there is room for im-
provement due to the short periods of this study. We strongly believe that participants
were unable to adequately get familiar with many of the VR interaction techniques that
were not inherently intuitive. The above observation might have had some impact on the
study outcomes, and we believe there is an opportunity for a future study that fully en-
gages the participants in long periods of VR sessions that requires a series of authentication
stages as the session progresses. It is our projection that great improvement will be seen
in the participant’s login speed, usability, and error-recovery. Lastly, results from the VR
shoulder-surfing indicates that the VR implementation of PATTERN has a high resistance,
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we believe as a future study, it will be interesting to use machine-learning techniques in
predicting the participants passwords from the recorded videos of their login activities.
6.2.3 BioMove Authentication
One limitation of this research is the unvailability of a large dataset with the data that is
needed to explore and obtain accurate FAR, FRR and EER values to achieve authentica-
tion. We plan to continue this research and collect data from a much larger population
and explore ways to provide authentication methods for VR systems. Secondly, because
our research was primarily focused on one of the most common user groups (i.e., those
between the ages of 18-30), we only recruited participants in this category. In the future,
we plan to extend our research to different age and gender groups and evaluate the relative
accuracy and robustness of our approach across multiple groups, especially taking into
account the effect of aging on the kinesiological movements of users. In addition, future
work will explore integrating our solution into pre-existing VR environment frameworks
when VR hardware manufacturers provide APIs that allow us to embed our systems into
their firmware. As a result, we will have a real-time application that will be totally respon-
sive and transparent to users while interacting with a VR device doing typical tasks such
playing a game, doing learning activities, and exploring multi-user worlds. We believe that
our research can serve as a second-factor authentication system where the verification will
be 1-to-1. In short, a larger and more diverse group of participants is required to enable us
to determine accurate values of FAR, FRR and EER, a more focused look at the effects of
aging on VR Identifications systems, and deployment of the BioMove systems into totally
untethered VR hardware will provide the data and insights that we require to design and
develop a more comprehensive solution to allow accurate and robust identification and
authentication of users in VR systems.
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